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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
A. America the Vulnerable
As Jonathan Raban wrote in a 2005 essay in the New York
Review of Books:
In its present form, the [American] War on Terror is a
crippling, expensive, meagerly productive effort to locate,
catch, and kill bad guys around the globe. Its successes
are hardly less random, or more effective in the long-term,
than those that might be achieved by a platoon of men
armed with flyswatters entering a slaughterhouse whose
refrigeration has been off for a week. 1
Sobering facts support Raban's flyswatters-in-a-
1. Jonathan Raban, The Truth About Terrorism, N.Y. REV. BKs. 22, 25
(Jan. 13, 2005).
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slaughterhouse metaphor. Stephen Flynn, a former Coast Guard
commander and director of global issues on the National Security
Council staff under President Bill Clinton, has written an entire
book, published in 2004, on the subject: America the Vulnerable:
How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism.2
Flynn argues that "[p]aradoxically, the United States has no rival
when it comes to projecting its military, economic, and cultural
power around the world," yet "we are practically defenseless at
home."3 In sobering tones-linking our national unpreparedness
for 9/11 to our homeland security at present-Flynn summarizes
our current state of national vulnerability to terrorism in an
extract worthy of complete quotation:
If September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call, clearly
America has fallen back asleep. Our return to
complacency could not be more foolhardy. The 9/11
attacks were not an aberration. The same forces that
helped to produce the horror that befell the nation on that
day continue to gather strength. Yet we appear to be
unwilling to do what must be done to make our society
less of a target. Instead, we are sailing into a national
security version of the Perfect Storm.
Homeland security has entered our post-9/11 lexicon, but
homeland insecurity remains the abiding reality. With
the exception of airports, much of what is critical to our
way of life remains unprotected.
From water and food supplies; refineries, energy grids,
and pipelines; bridges, tunnels, trains, trucks and cargo
containers; to the cyber backbone that underpins the
information age in which we live, the measures we have
been cobbling together are hardly fit to deter amateur
thieves, vandals, and hackers, never mind determined
terrorists. Worse still, small improvements are often
oversold as giant steps forward, lowering the guard of
2. See generally STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: How OUR
GOVERNMENT IS FAILING TO PROTECT Us FROM TERRORISM (2004).
3. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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average citizens as they carry on their daily routine with
an unwarranted sense of confidence. 4
In the American constitutional system, of course, matters of
foreign policy and national security are delegated by the People
principally to the president and executive agencies under his
purview (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the armed forces of the United
States).5 Congress, however, has from the founding days of the
Republic exercised "[a]ll legislative powers"-and related specific
powers-forming a tradition of vigorous oversight of executive
branch activities, in general, and of foreign policy oversight and
national security policy oversight, in particular.6 Yet, how has
Congress performed its oversight responsibilities in the wake of
9/11? And, how is it equipped to handle oversight of national
counterterrorism policy and its implementation in the remainder
4. Id. at 1-2. See also AMITAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY 118-
20 (2004) (comparing "small-scale terrorism" with the "massive terrorism"
risks of attacks on domestic populations with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), opining that "[tihe difference between small-scale and massive
terrorism is as significant as the difference between a crime wave and
genocide," providing the horrific hypothetical of al Qaeda "[getting] its hands
on a nuclear device" that could conceivably "obliterate Manhattan,
Washington, D.C., or Tel Aviv").
5. The principal Constitutional provisions which support presidential
power over foreign policy and national security are: U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America"), § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing a presidential oath to "preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States"), § 2, cl. 1 (the "President shall
be commander in chief of the armed forces"), and § 2, cl. 2 (presidential
power, with advice and consent of the Senate to "make treaties").
6. The principal constitutional provisions which support the
congressional power of oversight over the executive branch are: U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("[ajll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States"), § 7, cl. 2 (passage of bills), § 8, cl. 1 (taxing
power), § 8, cl. 2 (borrowing power), § 8, cl. 3 (regulation of foreign and
interstate commerce), § 8, cl. 4 (naturalization power), § 8, cl. 5 (coinage and
regulation of foreign coin value powers), § 8, cl. 10 (powers to punish piracies
and "felonies committed on the high seas"), § 8, cl. 11 (power to "declare war"
and related powers), § 8, cl. 12 (power to "raise and support armies"), § 8, cl.
13 (power to "provide and maintain a navy"), § 8, cl. 14 (power to "make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces"), § 8, cl. 15
(powers to "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions"), § 8, cl. 16 (powers to
organize army and discipline militia), and § 8, cl. 18 ("necessary and proper"
power to make laws).
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of the first decade of the twenty-first century? Trying to provide
some tentative answers to the two aforementioned questions will
be the overarching purposes of this Article.
B. Congressional Oversight of 9/11 and its Failure
Just when the Nation needed adroit and resolute oversight of
the causes and meaning of 9/11, the United States Congress
botched the job. Although Congress went through the motions of
overseeing how and why the executive branch-through such
agencies as the CIA and FBI-neglected to anticipate and prevent
the Attack on America on September 11, 2001, for reasons which I
seek to explain in this Article, the congressional exercise was a
charade, and the publication of its two-and-one-half inch thick,
royal blue-covered report, entitled Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 (hereinafter Joint Inquiry Report or JIR),7 was
a dismal failure.
As I will demonstrate, the 9/11 oversight failure of Congress
was due to a deficiency of institutional competence in matching
and reining in the executive branch's effort to stonewall and
obfuscate. While Congress tried to save face for its oversight
failure by acquiescing to the creation of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11
Commission"),8  this maneuver was not constitutionally
contemplated congressional oversight but congressional abdication
to executive branch manipulation. The central thesis of my
Article, then, is that Congress must resuscitate its institutional
competence for overseeing American counterterrorism policy and
its implementation. As I will explain, Congress can accomplish
renewed competence for oversight of national counterterrorism
through three specific actions: (1) consolidating intelligence
7. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, H.R. REP. No. 107-792
(2002) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT].
8. See Intelligence Authorization for the Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-306, 116 Stat. 2383 (2002). The 9/11 Commission ultimately prepared a
report. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004).
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functions, (2) fostering intelligence expertise among its members,
and (3) experimenting with more decentralized and indirect forms
of intervention with executive branch counterterrorism agencies.
Yet, since what is past is prologue to purposeful reform, a
substantial part of my Article is devoted to unpacking and
analyzing what Congress did and did not do leading up to its
issuance of the Joint Inquiry Report. Indeed, the meaning of the
Joint Inquiry Report can best be understood as a multi-flawed
legal process. Indeed, one of the purposes of this Article is to
analyze the Joint Inquiry Report from three process perspectives:
(1) the process of congressional oversight of executive intelligence
gathering activities in order to interpret the meaning of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11; (2) the attempt to interpret the process
failures of America's intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11; and
(3) the attempt to recommend new government processes of
national intelligence and security.
The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts. Part II
describes the origins, purposes, and structure of the JIR-an
undertaking by two permanent committees of Congress, one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate. 9 Part III
discusses and interprets the findings and conclusions of the Joint
Inquiry Report.10  Part IV examines the recommendations
contained in the congressional document." Part V focuses on the
additional views (in the nature of dissenting and concurring
opinions) of members of the Joint Inquiry. 12 Part VI discusses
Congress' constitutional responsibility for vigorous oversight of
the executive branch, the lost art of congressional oversight, and
some ideas for improving oversight of counterterrorism. 13
II. THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT INQUIRY
A. Origins and Purposes
In the words of the Joint Inquiry Report, "[iun February 2002
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
9. See infra notes 14-55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 56-122 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 123-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 178-251 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 252-304 and accompanying text.
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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a
Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated
against our nation on September 11, 2001."14 According to the
JIR, "[r]eflecting the magnitude of the events of that day, the
Committees' decision was unprecedented in Congressional history:
for the first time, two permanent committees, one from the House
and one from the Senate, would join together to conduct a single,
unified inquiry."15 The three key purposes of the Joint Inquiry
were to: (1) "conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence
Community knew or should have known prior to September 11,
2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the United
States, to include the scope and nature of any possible
international terrorist attacks against the United States and its
interests";16 (2) "identify and examine any systematic problems
that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of
or preventing these attacks in advance";17 and (3) "make
recommendations to improve the Intelligence Community's ability
to identify and prevent future international terrorist attacks."s
The Joint Inquiry Report highlights the congressional
oversight process which was pursued (in terms of documents
considered, witnesses interrogated, and the like) to create a
deceptive impression of thoroughness and completeness. In this
regard, the JIR states:
14. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. While the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence has no subcommittees, the name of one of the four
subcommittees of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence-
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security-reflects the post-9/11
national security context. See MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICs 2004 1799, 1806 (Charles Mahtesian ed.,
National Journal Group 2003). Interestingly, the House now has a separate
committee that did not participate in the Joint Inquiry called the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, which has five subcommittees:
Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; Emergency Preparedness
& Response; Infrastructure & Border Security; Intelligence &
Counterterrorism; and Rules. Id. at 1807.
15. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. There have been, however,
joint committee undertakings in the past by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
16. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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During the course of this Inquiry, these Committees have
held nine public hearings as well as thirteen closed
sessions in which classified information has been
considered. In addition, the Joint Inquiry Staff has
reviewed almost 500,000 pages of relevant documents
from the Intelligence Community agencies and other
sources, of which about 100,000 pages have been selected
for incorporation into the Joint Inquiry's records. The
Staff also conducted approximately 300 interviews and
has participated in numerous briefings and panel
discussions, that have involved almost 600 individuals
from the Intelligence Community agencies, other U.S.
Government organizations, state and local entities, and
representatives of the private sector and foreign
governments. 19
B. The Structure of the Joint Inquiry Report
The principal JIR consists of 435 pages (in addition to cover
letters, 20 a foreword, 21 a summary table of contents, 22 a detailed
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. (following the title page). Interestingly, the transmittal letter of
Dec. 20, 2002 to Robert C. Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate,
from Bob Graham, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and
Richard Shelby, Vice. Chair, indicated that the "highly classified and
sensitive information" not included in the JIR would be available to "all
members of the Senate" for readings in "secure facilities of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence." Id. The House of Representatives transmittal
letter was more restrictive. The transmittal letter of Dec. 20, 2002 to J.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, from Porter Goss, chair, and Nancy
Pelosi, ranking Democrat, while indicating that classified documents not
included in the JIR would be held in "a Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF)," made no mention in the transmitted letter to
the Speaker of the House of reading access by other members of the House to
the classified material. Id.
21. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1 (following the Senate and
House transmittal letters). The foreword provides a three paragraph
explanation for understanding additions and deletions to the original report
(before classification review). The foreword describes the process of JIR
writing, classification, addition, and redaction as follows:
This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint
Inquiry that was approved and filed with the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December 20, 2002. With the
exception of portions that were released to the public previously
(e.g., the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
etc.), this version has been declassified by the Intelligence
Community prior to its public release. That review was for
classification purposes only and does not indicate Intelligence
Community agreement with the accuracy of this report, or
concurrence with its factual findings or conclusions.
At appropriate points in the report, relevant information that
developed after the report was filed, or that has appeared in other
public sources, has been inserted and is denoted with an asterisk (*)
and an accompanying footnote. Where necessary, information that
the Intelligence Community has identified as classified for national
security purposes has been deleted. Such deletions are indicated
with brackets and a strikethrough [ ]. In other
portions of the report, alternative language that the Intelligence
Community has agreed is unclassified has been substituted for the
original report language which remains classified. Paragraphs that
contain alternative language, whether one word or several
sentences, have been identified by brackets at the beginning and end
of the paragraph.
As a result of these changes to the text, the page numbers at the
bottom of each page do not match those of the original report. In
order to preserve a record of the original pagination, page numbers
have been inserted in gray font [page xx] in the text to mark where
the corresponding pages begin and end in the original report.
Id. From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive
intelligence gathering, one is reminded of the M.C. Escher print depicting a
hand drawing another hand drawing the original hand.
22. Id. at i. This is the first page of the JIR that contains capital letters
in gray font with a strikethrough, at both the top and bottom of the page,
with the words "TOP SECRET." Every page of the JIR from i through 435
bears the same "TOP SECRET" strikethrough markings. See generally id.
The summary table of contents reads as follows:
Table of Contents
Members of the Joint Inquiry
Joint Inquiry Staff
Abridged Findings and Conclusions
Recommendations
Final Report
Part One-The Joint Inquiry
* The Context
* Factual Findings
* Conclusions-Factual Findings
* Systemic Findings
* Related Findings
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
Part Three-Topics-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
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table of contents,23 committee membership and staff rosters, 24 nine
separate pages of "[a]bridged [flindings [a]nd [cionclusions"25
incorporated into the document, and a 17-page errata set of
recommendations). 26
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
consists of nine principal headings:
I. The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001.27
II. Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-
Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi. 28
III. NASA Communication Intercepts Related to Khalid al-
Mihdhar, Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi.29
IV. Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Had Numerous
Contacts With an Active FBI Informant. 30
V. Associates of the September 11, 2001 Terrorists in the
United States.31
Part Four-Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain
Sensitive National Security Matters
Glossary of Terms and Key Names
Additional Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry
Appendices
Id.
23. Id. at ii-vii.
24. Id. at viii-x.
25. Id. at xi-xix.
26. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE
PERMANENT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REPT. No. 107-351, H. REPT. No. 107-792
(Dec. 2002) (ERRATA PRINT) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT ERRATA
PRINT].
From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive
intelligence gathering, one is reminded of the scene in the movie MR. SMITH
GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures, 1939) involving the character of
Jefferson Smith, played by Jimmy Stewart, being flustered and rattled by the
august presence of the more senior senator and his wiley daughter. Stewart
drops and fumbles with his hat throughout the scene, only to knock over a
lamp at the end of the scene.
27. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 128.
28. Id. at 143.
29. Id. at 155. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by
brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 155-57.
30. Id. at 157 (brackets omitted). A considerable portion of the content is
deleted by brackets and strikethroughs. Id. at 157-68.
31. Id. at 168. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by
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VI. Germany-Investigation of the Hamburg Cell.32
VII. The Hijackers' Visas.33
VIII. The Rising Threat and Context of the September 11
Attacks.34
IX. The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
Before September 11.35
brackets and strikethroughs. Id. at 168-83.
32. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 183. A considerable portion
of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs. Id. at 183-87.
33. Id. at 187.
34. Id. at 190. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into six sub-
headings:
A. New Breed of Terrorists
B. Emergence of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida
C. Attributes of Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations
D. Intelligence about Bin Ladin's Intentions to Strike Inside the
United States
E. Indications of a Possible Terrorist Attack in Spring and Summer
2001
F. Intelligence Information on Possible Terrorist Use of Airplanes as
Weapons.
Id. at 191, 194, 196, 198, 203, 209.
It should be noted that the JIR uses different spellings for Al Qaeda. To
the extent that I discuss matters in my own language I will utilize the
aforementioned spelling. Otherwise, when I am quoting the JIR I will use
the spelling provided by Congress.
35. Id. at 215. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by
brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 215-49. This heading of the JIR is
subdivided into 19 sub-headings:
A. Counterterrorism as an Intelligence Priority
B. Growing Importance in the Clinton Administration
C. Uncertainty During the Transition
D. The George W. Bush Administration
E. Competing Priorities
F. Policy Measures to Fight Terrorism
G. The Law Enforcement Approach
H. Disruption and Renditions
I. Afghanistan as a Terrorist Sanctuary
J. The Intelligence Community
K. The Declaration of War
L. The Intelligence Community's Response
M. Shortcomings in the Intelligence Community's Response
2005]
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Part Three-Topics-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
consists of fourteen principal headings:
I. Counterterrorism Resources. 36
II. Foreign Liaison. 37
III. Covert Action and Military Operations against Bin
Ladin. 3S
IV. Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding.39
V. Khalid Shaykh Mohammed: The Mastermind of
September 11.40
VI. The FBI's Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui before
September 11.41
VII. The Phonemix Electronic Communication (EC).42
VIII. Strategic Analyses. 43
IX. Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence
Community.44
N. The President and Senior Policy Advisor Responsibility
0. Lack of an Integrated Response
P. The Intelligence Community's Failure to Establish a Coordinated
Domestic Focus Before September 11, 2001
Q. Steps Taken to Fight International Terrorism at Home
R. Lack of Focus on Domestic Threat
S. Limited Counterterrorism by Other Intelligence Community
Members.
Id. at 216-20, 222, 225-26, 229-32, 234, 236, 241, 243, 247.
36. Id. at 250.
37. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 270. A considerable portion of
the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 270-78.
38. Id. at 279. The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets
and strikethroughs. See id. at 279-307.
39. Id. at 308.
40. Id. at 309. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by
brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 309-15.
41. Id. at 315.
42. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 325.
43. Id. at 336. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into four sub-
headings:
A. The Intelligence Community's Lack of Strategic Analysis
B. Analyst Qualifications and Training
C. Analysts' Access to Information
D. Language Skills
Id. at 336, 339, 341, 343.
44. Id. at 345. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into seven
subheadings:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
X. Information Sharing. 45
XI. Technology Gaps.
46
XII. Technical Collection of Terrorist Communications.4 7
XIII. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.48
XIV. Summary of Joint Inquiry Review of Anthrax
Attacks .49
The final part of the JIR in chief, Part Four-Finding,
Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National
Security Matters, is, perhaps, the most remarkable part of the
Joint Inquiry Report. The simple reason for its remarkability is
that, with the exception of a bracketed finding and bracketed
discussion (indicating the alternative language of the original JIR
language cleared by the Intelligence Community), virtually all
twenty-seven pages of this part are deleted! 50
Following the JIR in chief is a "Glossary of Terms and
Acronyms,"5 1 a table of "Key Names,"52 a table of "September 11,
A. Setting Priorities
B. Strategy and Organization
C. Should a Strong Director of National Intelligence Be Established?
D. Should the Same Person be both DNI and Director of the CIA?
E. Counterterrorism Within the United States and Creation of a
Domestic Intelligence Agency
F. A Legislative Charter for the Intelligence Community
G. Respect for the Rule of Law
Id. at 346-49, 353.
45. Id. at 354.
46. Id. at 368. The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets
and strikethroughs. See id. at 368-73.
47. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 373. The vast majority of the
content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 373-85.
48. Id. at 385. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by
brackets and strikethroughs. See id. at 385-94.
49. Id. at 393.
50. See supra note 21, at 395-422 and accompanying text.
51. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 424-33. Among the more
fascinating definitions contained in this portion of the JIR are the following:
Actionable Intelligence:
Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for
immediate exploitation without having to go through the full
intelligence production process; it may address strategic or tactical
needs, close support of US negotiating teams, or action elements
dealing with such matters as international terrorism or narcotics.
2005]
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Id. at 424.
Asset:
(1) Any resource-a person, group, relationship, instrument,
installation, supply-at the disposition of an intelligence agency for
use in an operational or support role. (2) A person who contributes
to a clandestine mission but is not a fully controlled agent.
Id.
Clandestine Operation:
A preplanned secret intelligence collection activity or covert political,
economic, propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to
assure the secrecy of the operation; encompasses both clandestine
collection and covert nation.
Id. at 425.
Classification:
The determination that official information requires, in the interest
of national security, a specific degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that
such a determination has been made; the designation is normally
termed a security classification and includes Confidential, Secret,
and Top Secret.
Id.
Counterintelligence:
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons,
or terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical,
document, or communication security programs.
Id.
Counterterrorism:
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a
terrorist act or the documented threat of such an act.
Id. at 425-26.
Domestic Collection:
The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United
States from governmental or nongovernmental organizations or
individuals who are witting sources and choose to cooperate by
sharing such information.
Id. at 427.
IC:
Intelligence Community-the aggregate of the following executive
branch organizations and agencies involved in intelligence activities:
the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the Department of
Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence
through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
2001 Hijackers,"53 "Additional Views of Members of the Joint
Inquiry,"54 and a number of appendices attached at the end of the
JIR.55
military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and staff
elements of the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Id. at 428-29.
International Terrorism:
Terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries in their conduct or
purpose, the nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the
incident. Such an act is usually designed to attract wide publicity to
focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the
perpetration.
Id. at 429-30.
PDB:
President's Daily Brief (prepared by CIA for President and very
small number of other senior officials)[.]
Id. at 431.
52. Id. at 434.
53. Id. at 435.
54. Id. (consisting of separately paginated additional views of Senator
Richard C. Shelby, Representative Michael N. Castle, Senator Mike DeWine,
Representative Jane Harman, Senator John Kyl and Senator Pat Roberts,
Senator Carl Levin, Senator Barbara Mikulski, and Representative Tim
Roemer).
55. Id. The list of appendices to the JIR includes the following:
* Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry.
" Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules.
* Joint Inquiry Hearings.
" List of Persons Interviewed.
" Counterterrorism Organizations Within the Intelligence
Community.
" Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response,
1983-2001.
• Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001.
* CIA/FBI Failures in Regard to Two September 11 Hijackers,
The Phoenix Electronic Communication.
" Moussaoui Related FBI Field Agent Notes and Field
Office/Headquarters E-mails.
* General Accounting Office: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax
Attacks.
* CTC Watchlisting Guidance-December 1999.
" The Joint Inquiry in Court.
" Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry.
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Id. (following page 435). While a detailed discussion of these voluminous
appendices is beyond the scope of this Article, it is tempting to offer a few
miscellaneous comments. First, most of the names on the Appendix List of
Persons Interviewed are deleted by brackets and strikethroughs, although
their official positions are referenced. See id. app. at 1-21. Second, the
Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-
2001, provides a synoptical summary of "big picture" world events, "selected
major terrorist events," and "U.S. institutional responses to terrorism,"
although a considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and
strikethroughs. See id. app. at 1-49. Third, the Appendix-Selected Events in
the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001 offers a striking visual timeline of
the following types of information: terrorist incidents, information indicating
terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States, information
indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons, and
communications intercepts suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities.
See id. app. (consisting of eleven unnumbered pages). Fourth, the Appendix
Joint Inquiry in Court details the tripartite branch processes of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches surrounding the investigation and litigation
involving Zacarias Moussaoui-the suspected "20th hijacker" on 9/11. See
id. app. at 1-5. Legal counsel from the congressional offices of Senate Legal
Counsel, House General Counsel, and General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry
were involved in contesting a DOJ-sought judicial protective order in the
Moussaoui case. See id. According to this Appendix:
With the assistance of the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and
House General Counsel, the General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry...
participated in the argument on August 29, 2002. The reply asked
the District Court to deny the DOJ's requested relief for three main
reasons: (1) the protective order does not govern testimony before
Congress, nor does it govern the production of documents to
Congress, the use of documents by it, or the issuance of its reports;
(2) Local Criminal Rule 57 specifically does not preclude the holding
of legislative hearings or the issuance of legislative reports, and (3)
the proposed expansion of the [protective] order by the Department
of Justice runs afoul of the separation of powers.
Id. app. at 3. The DOJ lost its motion to expand the scope of the Moussaoui
judicial protective order to cover the Joint Inquiry legislative proceedings. Id.
at 4-5. Yet, the following novel procedure was allowed by the Joint Inquiry:
In accordance with its commitment to consult with the Department
of Justice, the Joint Inquiry continued to allow DOJ to review and
comment regarding the contents of staff statements related to the
Moussaoui case and other matters. At the Joint Inquiry's September
24 [2002] public hearing that followed concerning the Moussaoui
matter, the Joint Inquiry permitted a DOJ representative to attend
with FBI witnesses for the purpose of advising whether any question
called for an answer that might impair the Moussaoui prosecution.
Thus, the Inquiry was able to proceed with a full public exposition of
the issues raised in the Moussaoui investigation without impeding
the due process and fair interests of Moussaoui and the DOJ.
Id. at 5.
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III. THE JIR's FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Joint Inquiry Report contains five key factual findings
and conclusions about the events leading up to the terrorist
attacks on September 11, sixteen "systemic findings" and
conclusions about the American Intelligence Community's
deficient counterterrorist efforts before September 11, and four
"related findings" and conclusions involving broader policy
questions beyond the American Intelligence Community. The
discussion that follows attempts to deconstruct this "bureaucrat-
speak" and to reconceptualize these twenty-five congressional
oversight findings and conclusions into nine generic process
failures of the American Intelligence Community. These nine
process failures are as follows: (A) the Forest Versus the Trees
Problem; (B) the Right Hand Versus the Left Hand Problem; (C)
the Chicken Little Problem; (D) the "Who's on First?" Problem; (E)
the "Show Me the Money" Problem; (F) the Dueling Banjoes
Problem; (G) the Through the Glass Darkly Problem; (H) the Good
Cop/Bad Cop Problem; and (I) the Catch-22 Problem. As will be
discussed in greater detail below, these nine generic process
failures of the American Intelligence Community are interrelated
and intergovernmental (horizontal as well as vertical) in nature.
A. The Forest Versus the Trees Problem
The bulk of the factual findings and conclusions of the JIR
can be better understood as a problem of perspective: while the
American Intelligence Community was obsessed with gathering
discrete details, the process of intelligence lacked a strategic
capability to put individual pieces of the terrorism puzzle into a
coherent and holistic picture. Thus, the factual findings
concerning intelligence on the threats posed by Osama Bin
Ladin,5 6 the Spring and Summer of 2001 information on Al
56. This factual finding of the JIR states:
While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of
valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist
activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of
the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless,
the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the
September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective
significance.
Id. at xi.
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Qaeda,57 1998-2001 intelligence,58 aircrafts and weapons data,5 9
and the "collective significance" myopia60 essentially describe a
57. This factual finding of the JIR states:
During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community
experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin
Ladin and al-Qa'ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the
very near future.
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xi.
58. This factual finding of the JIR states:
Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady,
stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of
terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony
and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the
Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the
threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S.
interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to
attack in the domestic United States.
Id.
59. Factual finding 4 of the JIR states:
From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community received information indicating that
terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use
of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any
specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S.
Government reaction to, this form of threat.
Id.
60. Factual finding number 5 of the JIR consists of an overarching
finding and ten sub-findings numbered 5a through 5j, inclusive. Overarching
finding number 5 states:
Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect
regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community
prior to September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus
on that information and consider and appreciate its collective
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the
Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming
to grips with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces
of information in the vast stream of data being collected were
overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at
the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required
additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct
connection to the hijackers could have been established. For all
those reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize
on available, and potentially important, information.
Id. Five of the sub-findings relate to the Forest Versus the Trees Problem:
sub-finding 5a, concerning "[tierrorist [clommunications in 1999" about
persons who, after September 11, 2001, were connected with the terrorist
attacks of that day, id. at xii (JIR brackets omitted); sub-finding 5b,
concerning "Malaysia [m]eeting and [tiravel of al-Qaida [olperatives to the
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failure of the American Intelligence Community to appreciate the
"forest" that its "trees" of intelligence suggested. Moreover, two of
the four "related findings" in the Joint Inquiry Report are in the
nature of a forest-versus-the-trees process failure of the American
Intelligence Community: the failure of the U.S. Government to
"undertake a comprehensive effort to implement defensive
measures in the United States" despite intelligence information
spanning the time of "1998 through the summer of 2001 indicating
that Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network intended to strike
inside the United States,"61 and the failure of the U.S.
Government to benefit from "an alert, mobilized and committed
American public" stemming from a lack of notice "to alert the
American public to the reality and gravity of the threat" of
terrorist attacks before September 11, 2001.62 Indeed, the general
conclusion to the JIR factual findings consists of a lamentation
over perspective failure before 9/11:
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence
Community failed to capitalize on both the individual and
collective significance of available information that
appears relevant to the events of September 11. As a
result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt
the September 11 plot by denying entry to or detaining
would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel the plot
through surveillance and other investigative work within
the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened
state of alert and thus harden the homeland against
attack.
No one will ever know what might have happened had
United States" regarding a 2000 rendezvous between two individuals who
had a key role in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, id.; sub-finding 5c,
dealing with [tierrorist [c]ommunications in [slpring 2000 regarding known
communication involving an individual who had attended the Malaysia
meeting, id.(JIR brackets omitted); sub-finding 5g, concerning "[h]ijackers in
[clontact [w]ith [plersons of FBI [i]nvestigative [iInterest in the United
States," id. at xiv; and sub-finding 5h, concerning the CIA's awareness, but
missed opportunities, of the [h~ijackers' [aissociation in Germany." Id. (JIR
brackets omitted).
61. Related finding 17 of the JIR, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at
xviii.
62. Related finding 19 of the JIR, id. at xix.
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more connections been drawn between these disparate
pieces of information. We will never definitively know to
what extent the Community would have been able and
willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may have
emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence
Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring
together and fully appreciate a range of information that
could have greatly enhanced the chances of uncovering
and preventing Osama Bin Ladin's plan to attack these
United States on September 11, 2001.63
Importantly, the first systemic finding also speaks of the
fundamental failure of the American Intelligence Community to
perceive the forest from the trees, noting that "[p]rior to
September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well
organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the
challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the
domestic Untied States" because of "[s]erious gaps [that] existed
between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S.
domestic intelligence capabilities" stemming from "inadequate
attention" by the CIA "to the potential for a domestic attack" and
the inability of the FBI "to identify and monitor effectively the
extent of activity by al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist
groups operating in the United States."64
B. The Right Hand Versus the Left Hand Problem
A central feature of the factual findings and conclusions of the
Joint Inquiry Report is professed amazement by Congress at the
two distinct cultures of the CIA, on the one hand, and the FBI, on
the other hand. As one of the JIR's factual findings expresses the
problem, the right hand of the American Intelligence Community
did not know what the left hand was up to in dealing with known
terrorists in the United States before September 11:
[Two key hijackers had] numerous contacts with a long
time FBI counterterrorism informant in California
and... a third future hijacker.., apparently had more
limited contact with the informant. In mid-to-late-2000,
63. Conclusion to factual findings of the JIR, id. at xv (emphasis added).
64. Systemic finding 1, id.
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the CIA already had information indicating that [two of
the hijackers] had [been in the United States] but the two
had not been watchlisted and information suggesting that
two suspected terrorists could well be in the United
States had not yet been given to the FBI. The San Diego
FBI field office that handled the informant in question,
did not receive that information [from the CIA] or any of
the other intelligence information pertaining to [two
terrorists in the country] prior to September 11, 2001. As
a result, the FBI missed the opportunity to ask a
uniquely well-positioned informant-who denies having
any advance knowledge of the plot-to collect information
about the hijackers and their plans within the United
States. 65
One systemic finding of the Joint Inquiry Report speaks of the
two cultures dividing the CIA and the FBI and the attendant lack
of information sharing between these agencies before September
11.66 A related right hand/left hand systemic finding addresses
the divide between the American Intelligence Community versus
the non-Intelligence Community.67
65. Factual sub-finding 5d, id. at xii-iii.
66. Systemic finding 9 of the JIR states:
The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place
all terrorism-related information from all sources. While the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center does manage overseas operations and has
access to most Intelligence Community information, it does not
collect terrorism-related information from all sources, domestic and
foreign. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not
adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to
September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of
a number of factors, including differences in the agencies' missions,
legal authorities and cultures. Information was not sufficiently
shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies,
but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence
and the law enforcement agencies.
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.
67. Systemic finding 10 of the JIR provides:
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted prior to
September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant
non-Intelligence Community agencies. This included other federal
agencies as well as state and local authorities. This lack of
communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as
well as the Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable
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C. The Chicken Little Problem
The well-known children's story about Chicken Little is a
cautionary tale about the dangers of over-reaction. 68 The deeper
social problem illustrated by the Chicken Little parable, however,
is when real dangers are underappreciated and under-deterred.
Part of this problem might stem from past exaggerations.
Alternatively, part of the problem might arise from too many
tasks and not enough resources. In either case, it is apparent that
the congressional investigation discerned a kind of problem where
FBI superiors underappreciated real dangers of domestic terrorist
attacks from domestically trained terrorist-pilots. According to an
eerie JIR factual finding:
On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent
an "Electronic Communication" to 4 individuals in the
Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and two people in
the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI headquarters,
and to two agents on International Terrorist squads in
the New York Field office. In the communication, the
agent expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand
knowledge, that there was a coordinated effort underway
by Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for
civil aviation-related training. He noted that there was
an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative
interest" in this type of training in Arizona and expressed
his suspicion that this was an effort to establish a cadre
of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct future
terrorist activity. The Phoenix [electronic
communication] requested that FBI Headquarters
consider implementing four recommendations:
* accumulate a list of civil aviation
university/colleges around the country;
* establish liaison with these schools;
information in the "war" against Bin Ladin. The Inquiry's focus on
the Intelligence Community limited the extent to which it explored
these issues, and this is an area that should be reviewed further.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. For an updated version, see JAMEs FINN GARNER, POLITICALLY
CORRECT BEDTIME STORIES 57-62 (1994).
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" discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix
[electronic communication] with the Intelligence
Community; and
* consider seeking authority to obtain visa
information concerning individuals seeking to
attend flight schools.
However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action
requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001. The
communication generated little or no interest at either FBI
Headquarters or the FBI's New York field office. 69
D. The "Who's On First?" Problem
While the late comedic team of Abbott and Costello achieved
regular laughs in performing their play on words involving
different baseball runners with pronouns for names,70 one way of
interpreting their routine is as a moral tale of the organizational
risks of widespread incompetence. Numerous findings of the Joint
69. Factual sub-finding 5e, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xii.
For a journalistic account of the FBI and international terrorism leading up
to the events of 9/11, see generally PETER LANCE, 1000 YEARS FOR REVENGE:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE FBI-THE UNTOLD STORY (2003). In the
discussion supporting factual sub-finding 5e, the JIR suggests that the
problem was, at bottom, a resource issue. Before the Joint Inquiry, the
Phoenix agent who authored the Phoenix communication testified that:
"What I wanted was an analytical product. I wanted this discussed with the
Intelligence Community. I wanted to see if my hunches were correct." He
noted, however, that he also knew this type of analytical product took a back
seat to operational matters at the FBI:
But, I am also a realist. I understand that the people at FBI
Headquarters are terribly overworked and understaffed, and
they have been for years. And at the time that I am... sending
this in, having worked this stuff for 13 years, and watched the
unit in action over the years, I knew that this was going to be at
the bottom of the pile, so to speak, because they were dealing
with real-time threats, real-time issues trying to render
fugitives back to the United States from overseas for justice.
And again, it is a resource issue.
The Phoenix agent was correct, and his communication did fall to the bottom of
the pile.
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21.
70. BUD ABBOTT AND Lou COSTELLO, Who's On First?, in THE NAUGHTY
NINETIES (Universal 1945).
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Inquiry Report portray an incompetent American Intelligence
Community (an oxymoron of sorts) in disarray. In the first place,
three JIR factual sub-findings relate to specific instances of
organizational incompetence leading up to September 11. One
sub-finding addresses the legal mistake of FBI officials
investigating suspected confederates in the 9/11 hijackings; 71
another sub-finding focuses on the maladroit manner in which
American officials handled the mastermind of the September 11
attacks while he was awaiting a trial for an earlier act of
terrorism;72 and a third sub-finding deals with bungling by the
71. Factual sub-finding 5f, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xiii-
xiv. The sub-finding provides:
In August 2001, the FBI's Minneapolis field office, in conjunction
with the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], detained
Zacarias Massouri, a French national who had enrolled in flight
training in Minnesota. FBI agents there also suspected that
Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot. FBI Headquarters
attorneys determined that there was not probable cause to obtain a
court order to search Moussaoui's belongings under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel at FBI
Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the
National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis
field office, misunderstood the legal standards for obtaining an order
under FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis field office personnel
wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the
Chechen rebels to al-Qa'ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently
connected Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat
environment in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix communication, or
the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States.
Id.
72. Factual sub-heading 5i, id. at xiv. The sub-finding states:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information
linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the
Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks to Bin
Ladin, to terrorist plans to use an aircraft as weapons, and to
terrorist activity in the United States. The Intelligence Community,
however, relegated ... KSM to rendition target status following his
1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result,
focused primarily on his location, rather than his activities and place
in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy. The Community also did not recognize
the significance of reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM's active
role in sending terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of
their activities upon arriving in the United States. Collection efforts
were not targeted on information about KSM that might have helped
better understand al-Qa'ida's plans and intentions and KSM's role in
the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the Intelligence
Community.
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National Security Agency (NSA) in neglecting to translate and
disseminate intercepted communications that indicated the threat
of imminent terrorist attacks in September of 2001. 73
In the second place, six systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry
Report are properly categorized as "Who's on First?" Problems.
First, systemic finding 2 states:
Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S.
Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community
had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for
combating the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin.
Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range
of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat
the growing threat to the United States.74
Interestingly, the JIR discussion supporting this systemic
finding notes that "[t]he Intelligence Community is a large
distributed organism. It encompasses 14 agencies and tens of
thousands of employees" and "[t]he number of people employed
exclusively in the effort against Usama Bin Ladin and A1-Qaeda
was relatively small."75 Yet, revealingly, Congress found that
"these people were operating in geographically dispersed locations,
often not connected by secure information technologies, and
within established bureaucracies that were not culturally or
organizationally attuned to one another's requirements," while
"[m]any of them had limited experience against the target and did
not know one another[,]" but "[t]o achieve success in such an
environment, leadership is a critical factor" and "the Intelligence
Community's structure made leadership difficult."76 Moreover, in
a searing indictment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
Id.
73. Factual sub-finding 5j, id. at xv. The sub-finding provides:
In the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001, NSA
intercepted, but did not translate or disseminate until after
September 11, some communications that indicated possible
impending terrorist activity.
Id. (brackets omitted). The discussion supporting sub-finding 5j is largely
deleted or bracketed. Id. at 32.
74. Id. at xvi.
75. Id. at 39.
76. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 39.
2005]
26 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:1
the Joint Inquiry Report discussion concludes that the record
"indicates that the DCI did not marshal resources effectively even
within the CIA against the threat posed by al-Qa'ida" and
"[diespite the DCI's declaration to CIA officials that the Agency
was at war with Bin Ladin... the DCI's Counterterrorist Center
needed additional personnel prior to September 11, and the lack of
resources had a substantial impact on its ability to detect and
monitor al-Qa'ida's activities."77
Second, systematic finding 5, at its heart, rails against the
rampant incompetence of the American Intelligence officials,
stating:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community's
understanding of al Qa'ida was hampered by insufficient
analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of
strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not
always used effectively because of the perception in some
quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were
less important to agency counterterrorism missions than
were operations/personnel. The quality of
counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many
analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained,
and without access to critical information. As a result,
there was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis
targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to
comprehend the collective significance of individual
pieces of intelligence. These analytic deficiencies
seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to
understand the full nature of the threat, and to make
fully informed decisions.78
The JIR's discussion in support of this systematic finding
points out the absence of dissenting opinions in the Intelligence
Community's analysis provided to government policymakers,
quoting the testimony of the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard
Armitage, who observed:
I am the consumer. It's very rare that we get the one off
voice or the dissident voice .... For a policy maker, the
77. Id. at 41.
78. Id. at xvi.
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dissident voice is very helpful to either confirm what you
think or really open up a new area, and this is not
generally done. If I had to say the one biggest weakness
in the analysis area, I would say that's it. Second, it's the
way analysis in the Intelligence Community is generally
put forth, and it's related, and that is consensus .... I
really would just enforce this observation about the need
to get alternative views up, because most everything
that's important here is shrouded in ambiguity and
uncertainty. There is a tendency to want to get things
scrubbed out to get the differences eliminated. 79
Third, systemic finding 8 addresses a "Who's on First?"
Problem: "the continuing erosion of NSA's [National Security
Agency's] program management expertise and experience has
hindered its contribution to the fight against terrorism. NSA
continues to have mixed results in providing timely technical
solutions to modern intelligence collection, analysis, and
information sharing problems."80
Fourth, systemic finding 11 focuses on ineptness, stating:
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community
did not effectively develop and use human sources to
penetrate the al-Qa'ida inner circle. This lack of reliable
and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited
the Community's ability to acquire intelligence that could
be acted upon before the September 11 attacks. In part,
at least, the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited)
counterterrorism sources was a product of an excessive
reliance on foreign liaison services.8'
Fifth, systemic finding 15 is related to the aforementioned
systemic finding 11.82 According to systemic finding 15, the
79. Id. at 68.
80. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. The discussion in
support of this systemic finding mentions a lack of basic skills by NSA
personnel, "frustration regarding their current working environment," and "a
high level of frustration among contractors who do business with the NSA."
Id. at 76-77.
81. Id. at xvii. The discussion in support of this systemic finding has
been sanitized by substantial deletion of national security sensitive
information. See id. at 90-96.
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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American Intelligence Community "depended [too] heavily on
foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection
of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of
counterterrorism activities," while "fail[ing] to coordinate their
relationships with foreign services adequately."8 3
Finally, systemic finding 16 also reminds one of Abbott and
Costello's famous routine. It states, in a sanitized version that
had to be rewritten by congressional staffers to satisfy national
security reviewers:
The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United
States appear to have been financed, in large part, from
monies sent to them from abroad and also brought on
their persons. Prior to September 11, there was no
coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy to track
terrorist funding and close down their financial support
networks. There was also a reluctance in some parts of
the U.S. Government to track terrorist funding and close
down their financial support networks. As a result, the
U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial support
for Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist activities effectively.8 4
E. The "Show Me the Money" Problem
The phrase "show me the money" was made popular in the
film Jerry Maguire when co-star Cuba Gooding Jr., as Rod
Tidwell, the pro football player/client, sticks by his sports agent,
Jerry Maguire, and insists that Maguire "show me the money."8 5
It is an apt phrase to remind us of the importance of money-and
the converse situation of a lack of money-in carrying out the pre-
September 11 counterterrorism responsibilities of the United
States Intelligence Community. Two systemic findings in the
Joint Inquiry Report address "show me the money" problems:
systemic findings 3 and 6.
83. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii. The discussion in
support of this systemic finding is mostly uninformative because of the
substantial deletion of national security sensitive information. See id. at 109-
13.
84. Id. at xviii (brackets omitted). As one would expect in a situation
where even the systemic finding, itself, was subject to revision on grounds of
national security, the discussion supporting this finding is likewise sanitized.
See id. at 113-17.
85. JERRY MAGUIRE (Columbia/Tristar 1996).
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Systemic finding 3 essentially blames inefficiencies in funding
processes-involving both Congress and the Intelligence
Community-coupled with a multiplicity of appropriation
requirements and priorities in hindering an effective anti-
terrorism policy in the United States before 9/11.86 As explained
in cleaned-up-for-national-security language supporting this
systemic finding: "throughout the Joint Inquiry, numerous
officials ... testified that the greatest constraint in their effort
against al-Qa'ida was the availability of too few resources,
compounded by too many requirements and priorities."8 7
Systemic finding 6 focuses on the lack of resources in
translating foreign language terrorist information.88  The JIR
discussion on this point simply observes:
The language problem has been one of the Intelligence
Community's perennial shortfalls. Prior to September 11,
the shortages of language specialists who would be
qualified to process large amounts of foreign language
data in general, and Arabic in particular, was one of the
most serious issues limiting the Intelligence Community's
ability to analyze, discern, and report on terrorist
activities in a timely fashion.8 9
F. The Dueling Banjoes Problem
The 1973 film, Deliverance, introduced the "dueling banjoes"
86. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi. Systemic finding 3
states:
Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, overall
Intelligence Community funding fell or remained even in constant
dollars, while funding for the Community's counterterrorism efforts
increased considerably. Despite these increases, the accumulation of
intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirement process, the
overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on
supplemental appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community
resources effectively against an evolving terrorist threat.
Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were
compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting
practices and procedures.
Id.
87. Id. at 46 (brackets omitted).
88. Id. at xvi.
89. Id. at 70.
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scene and subsequent hit song featuring two banjo players trying
to out perform and compete with one another.90 While this
analogy to the American Intelligence Community and military is
imperfect (in the film a certain synergy developed from the
competition while the pre-9/11 era American governmental actions
were discordant), the analogy is of use in depicting the degree of
competitiveness between segments of the federal government in
fighting terrorism. Two systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry
Report deal with "dueling banjoes" issues: systemic findings 7 and
14.
Systemic finding 7 highlights the friction between three key
government intelligence agencies: the FBI, the CIA and the
NSA.91 One type of ongoing conflict was between the NSA and the
FBI over which agency should collect potentially terroristic
communications between individuals within the United States.
This created what the JIR calls a "gap ... between the level of
coverage of communications between the United States and
foreign countries that was technically and legally available to the
Intelligence Community and the actual use of that surveillance
capability."92 Another type of perennial friction was between the
NSA and the CIA over "which agency was in charge of developing
and using.. .technology when human intelligence and signals
intelligence targets overlapped." 93 Specifically, the "CIA perceived
NSA as wanting to control technology deployment and
development, while NSA was concerned that CIA was conducting
NSA-type operations."94
90. ERIC WEISSBERG & STEVE MANDEL, Dueling Banjos, on THE ORIGINAL
SOUNDTRACK: DELIVERANCE (Warner Brothers 1973).
91. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. Systemic finding 7, in
sanitized language, provides:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community's ability to
produce significant and timely signals intelligence on
counterterrorism was limited by NSA's failure to address modern
communications technology aggressively, continuing conflict between
Intelligence Community agencies, NSA's cautious approach to any
collection of intelligence relating to activities in the United States,
and insufficient collaboration between NSA and FBI regarding the
potential for terrorist attacks within the United States.
Id. (brackets omitted).
92. Id. at 74-75 (brackets omitted).
93. Id. at 75 (brackets omitted).
94. Id. (brackets omitted).
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Systemic finding 14 addresses the distrust and tension
between the American military and the CIA in failing to better
coordinate operations against Al Qaeda before September 11.95
From the CIA's perspective, "the U.S. military often levied so
many requirements for highly detailed, actionable intelligence
prior to conducting an operation-far beyond what the
Intelligence Community was ever likely to obtain-that the U.S.
military units were effectively precluded from conducting
operations against Bin Ladin's organization" in south central Asia
prior to September 11.96 A former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, however, believed that it was not the military's key mission
to go after Bin Ladin; rather, he thought "that the CIA and FBI
should have the lead roles in countering terrorism, and that
military tools should be viewed as an extension and supplement to
the leading roles played by the CIA and FBI."97 Moreover, the
former Chairman was of the view that "actionable intelligence"
was too weak to outweigh the risks of military operations that
would attempt to "swoop" and pursue terrorists in an undeclared
war in another country.98 Despite these conflicting positions from
top government officials, the JIR indicates that some cooperation
between the CIA and the military directed at Bin Ladin did ensue
prior to 9/11. 99
95. See id. at xviii. Systemic finding 14, edited for reasons of national
security, states:
Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use U.S. military
assets to conduct offensive counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan,
or to support or participate in CIA operations directed against al-
Qa'ida prior to September 11. At least part of this reluctance was
driven by the military's view that the Intelligence Community was
unable to provide the intelligence needed to support military
operations. Although the U.S. military did participate in [ - I
counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist
network prior to September 11, 2001, most of military's focus was on
force protection.
Id. (brackets omitted).
96. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 107.
97. Id. at 106.
98. Id.
99. These included cruise missile attacks against Bin Ladin on August
20, 1998, "following the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa," id. at
108; positioning of U.S. naval vessels in the North Arabian Sea between 1999
and 2001 "to launch additional cruise missile strikes at Bin Ladin in the
event the Intelligence Community was able to obtain precise information on
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G. The Through the Glass Darkly Problem
According to scripture, some things we see "face to face" and
completely; other things we see "through a glass, darkly" and
know only in part. 00 In other words, it is difficult to see through a
turgid medium-even under the best of circumstances. Systemic
finding 12 of the Joint Inquiry Report concentrates on the
Through the Glass Darkly Problem in stating:
During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence
Community was bracing for an imminent al-Qa'ida
attack, difficulties with FBI applications for Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance and the
FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of
suspected al-Qa'ida operatives in the United States. The
effect of these difficulties was compounded by the
perception that spread among FBI personnel at
Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process
was lengthy and fraught with peril. 101
This turgidness was one of law and the perception of law.
Judicial interpretations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) supposedly led to a chilling effect on FBI agents who
stopped applying for electronic surveillance orders directed at Al
Qaeda suspects. 10 2
H. The Good Cop/Bad Cop Problem
The "good cop/bad cop" paradigm is useful in describing
scenarios where, on the one hand, rules and processes are
scrupulously observed, and, on the other hand, these rules and
processes are ruthlessly ignored. 1 3 Systemic finding 18 of the
his whereabouts in Afghanistan," id.; and military assistance "in the
development of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle as a second source of
intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin's precise whereabouts in Afghanistan." Id.
100. 1 Corinthians 13:12 states: "For now we see through a glass, darkly;
but then face-to-face; now I know, in part, then shall I know even as also I am
known."
101. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.
102. Id. at 96-97.
103. My sense of using the term "good cop, bad cop" differs a bit from its
typical use as "a psychological tactic, often used by police for interrogation."
Thus:
Two 'cops' alternate their interviews. The 'Bad Cop' behaves
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Joint Inquiry Report can be understood as presenting a good
cop/bad cop dichotomy. It states:
Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism
strategy adopted by the U.S. Government did not succeed
in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training
ground for Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network. A range
of instruments were used to counter al-Qa'ida, with law
enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because
other means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to
produce results. While generating numerous successful
prosecutions, law enforcement efforts were not adequate
by themselves to target or eliminate Bin Ladin's
sanctuary. The United States persisted in observing the
rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior,
but Bin Ladin and al-Qaida recognized no rules and
thrived in the safe haven provided by Afghanistan. 104
The JIR expounds on this finding by pointing out the
incredible naivet6, at best, or recklessness, at worst, of the
executive branch of the United States government during the
period between 1996 and 9/11. According to the report's
discussion, "[slome CIA analysts and operators ... recognized as
early as 1997 or 1998 that, as long as the Taliban continued to
grant Bin Ladin's terrorist organization sanctuary in Afghanistan,
it would continue to train a large cadre of Islamic extremists and
generate numerous terrorist operations." 105 Yet there was no
systematic executive branch effort to use all available means to
root out and disable Bin Ladin. As noted in the JIR: "Despite the
Intelligence Community's growing recognition that Afghanistan
was churning out thousands of radicals, the U.S. government did
not integrate all the instruments of national power and policy-
negatively toward the subject, making blatant accusations,
derogatory comments, threats, and in general raising the subject's
antipathy. This sets the stage for the 'Good Cop' to deceptively act
supportive, understanding, defensive, and in general show sympathy
for the subject, which may make the subject cooperative towards the
latter.
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good-cop/bad-cop (last visited Oct.
26, 2005).
104. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii-xix (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 120.
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diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military-to address this
problem."10 6  Moreover, the analysis goes on to state that
"[p]ermitting the sanctuary in Afghanistan to exist for as long as
it did allowed Bin Ladin's key operatives to meet, plan operations,
train recruits, identify particularly capable recruits or those with
specialized skills, and ensure that al-Qa'ida's masterminds
remained beyond the reach of international justice."10 7
The JIR's most incisive support for its "good cop/bad cop"
systemic finding culminates in the following discussion:
The reliance on law enforcement when individuals can
operate from a hostile country such as the Taliban's
Afghanistan appears particularly ineffective, as the
masterminds are often beyond the reach of justice. One
FBI agent, in a Joint [I]nquiry interview, scorned the idea
of using the [FBI] to take the lead in countering al-Qa'ida.
He noted that the FBI can only arrest and support
prosecution and cannot shut down training camps in
hostile countries. He added that, "it is like telling the
FBI after Pearl Harbor, go to Tokyo and arrest the
Emperor." In his opinion, a military solution was
necessary because, "the Southern District of New York
doesn't have any cruise missiles." 0
I. The Catch-22 Problem
This "Catch-22" Problem, of course, is inspired by Joseph
Heller's famous post-World War II novel'0 9 which describes an
American military rule allowing airmen to contend that they were
mentally unfit, and thereby unable to fly more missions, with a
cognate rule that such a claim conclusively indicated that a
complaining airman was not crazy and would, therefore, have to
fly more missions."0 As I use this phrase, it seeks to convey the
106. Id. at 121 (brackets omitted). Tellingly, there is a bracketed and
deleted two and a half sentences set forth in the JIR after the quoted
sentence in the text-presumably a detailed assessment of specific executive
branch failings to support the topic sentence of the paragraph-excised by
national security censors. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 123 (brackets omitted in last two sentences).
109. See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 45-46 (1961).
110. See id.
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absurdity of having the United States Congress, seeking to
publicly assess and critique the executive branch's intelligence
failures in the years leading up to September 11, 2001, hamstrung
by national security censors in the executive branch so that
certain intelligence failures are unknowable by virtue of their
deletion in the Joint Inquiry Report.
The Catch-22 Problem is most prominently portrayed in JIR
systemic finding 13, which consists of ten lines of bracketed and
deleted text; not one word remains in the Joint Inquiry Report of
systemic finding 13!111 We are given tantalizing hints of the
content of systemic finding 13 in the discussion portion of the
report. First, the JIR, in sanitized prose, indicates that "[diuring
his tenure, President Clinton signed documents authorizing CIA
covert action against Osama Bin Ladin and his principal
lieutenants."112 This analysis is followed by twenty lines of
deleted text (including two bulleted items amid this text). What
are we to make of this? Like an archaeologist who finds a shard of
pottery at an excavation site, we have little to go on other than the
seeming relevance of presidentially-authorized CIA covert action.
Second, we get another clue in the sanitized text which
follows these deletions:
Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified
to the Joint Inquiry... that, from the time of the East
Africa U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998, the U.S.
Government was:
... embarked on an [sic] very intense effort to get Bin
Ladin, to get his lieutenants, thorough overt and covert
means .... We were involved-at that point, our intense
focus was to get Bin Ladin, to get his key lieutenants.
The President conferred a number of authorities on the
Intelligence Community for that purpose [sic].
Senator Shelby: By "get him," that means kill him if you
had to, capture or kill him?
Mr. Berger: I don't know what I can say in this hearing, but
capture and kill .... There was no question that the cruise
missiles were not trying to capture him. They were not law
111. See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii-xviii.
112. Id. at 98 (brackets omitted).
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enforcement techniques .... "113
Aha! If we were archeologists that clue might be likened to
finding the rest of the pottery such that we can now tell that the
original shard came from a container which held precious potions.
Systemic finding 13 must deal (we would surmise) with the CIA's
covert attempts to kill Bin Ladin and his henchmen!
A third clue to the probable substance of the JIR systemic
finding 13 is an unsanitized quote: "As former National Security
Advisor Berger noted in his Joint Inquiry interview, 'we do not
have a rogue CIA."'114 A "rogue" CIA? Does this mean that
Congress was onto some misbehavior of CIA operatives in trying
to "get" Bin Ladin? We are quickly disabused of this inference,
however, in the fourth scrap of discussion commentary in the JIR
that ostensibly supports the phantom systemic finding 13, quoting
from the briefing provided by national security official Richard
Clarke:115
I think if you look at the 1980s and 1970s, the individuals
who held the job of DDO, one after another of them was
either fired or indicted or condemned by a Senate
committee. I think under those circumstances, if you
become Director of Operations, you would want to be a
little careful not to launch off on covert operations that
will get you personally in trouble and will also hurt the
institution. The history of covert operations in the 1950s
and 1960s and 1970s was not a happy one, and I think
that lesson got over-learned by people .... I think that
they institutionalized a sense of covert action is risky and
is likely to blow up in your face. And the wise guys at the
White House who are pushing you to do covert action will
be nowhere to be found when the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence calls you up to explain the mess that the
covert action became.116
So we suppose-but really cannot be sure-that the JIR
113. Id. at 98-99 (brackets omitted).
114. Id. at 99.
115. As of April of 2004, Richard Clarke's exposd book on pre-9/11 events
was a national bestseller. Cf RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004).
116. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 99-100 (emphasis added).
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concluded that the CIA did a lousy job of "getting" Bin Ladin
because of a culture that had developed in the American
Intelligence Community that disfavored and discouraged covert
operations.
The Catch-22 Problem is also apparent in the sketchy,
sanitized related finding 20,117 and the breathtaking twenty-seven
pages of backup discussion that is redacted and deleted in the
Joint Inquiry Report!18 We know by reading a sanitized version
of finding 20 at the back of the JIR that it deals with "information
suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the
September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States""19
and information "concerning these potential sources of support."120
We also know that the JIR complained about the "gap in U.S.
intelligence coverage," and admonished that "[t]he Intelligence
Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively
and as quickly as possible."121 That's it! Was it secret support
from Saudi Arabian sources that is hinted at in the sanitized
language of the Joint Inquiry Report?122
IV. THE JIR's RECOMMENDATIONS
As a sign of the haste (and perhaps sloppiness) with which the
Joint Inquiry Report was put together, nineteen specific
recommendations were "inadvertently" left out of the JIR when
they should have been included following the findings and
117. See id. at xix. The language of finding 20 in the summary findings
simply states: "Located in Part Four entitled "Finding, Discussion and
Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters." Id. A
sanitized, expanded version of finding 20 is found buried at the end of the
report. Id. at 395.
118. See id. at 296-422. Isolated, unhelpful words and phrases are
sprinkled throughout these pages. See, e.g., id. at 406 ("The Joint Inquiry
also found"), 413 ("In testimony before the Joint Inquiry"), 416 ("Finally").
Why did Congress bother to insert these inane phrases amid a sea of deleted
pages?
119. Id. at 395 (brackets omitted).
120. Id. (brackets omitted).
121. JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 395 (brackets omitted).
122. See generally LANCE, supra note 69. Cf BOB GRAHAM, INTELLIGENCE
MATTERS: THE CIA, THE FBI, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICA'S
WAR ON TERROR 168-69, 202, 216, 225, 229 (2004) (arguing financial support of
Saudi Arabia for terrorists).
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conclusions portion of the congressional document. 123 A cynic
would be tempted to conclude that Congress had become so
accustomed to having scores of pages of the JIR deleted by
executive branch national security censors that they thought it
would be a good idea to omit the Congressional recommendations
as well.
The congressional recommendations contained in the "errata
print" addendum to the Joint Inquiry Report can be usefully
divided into three overarching categories: (A) suggested statutory
changes in national security laws, legislative budgetary changes,
and the like; (B) requested reports from executive branch agencies
on national security topics; and (C) suggested executive branch
actions on national security. Some numbered recommendations in
the JIR errata print contain more than one category of suggested
governmental changes; therefore, I will not bother to reference
recommendations by number, but will simply cite the relevant
pages of the JIR errata print.
A. Suggested Statutory or Budgetary Changes in National
Security Laws
The first and most prominent recommendation for statutory
or budgetary changes in national security laws is that Congress
should "amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create and
sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who
shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence," 124 with
the Director-a "Cabinet level position"125-"hav[ing] the full
range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities
needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as
a coherent whole." 126 As part of the JIR's recommendation, the
Director of National Intelligence would have the legal authority,
presumably set by federal statute, for the: (1) "establishment and
123. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 1. Sloppiness is
further apparent in the ERRATA print's footnoted reference to a "[list of
previous commissions that addressed intelligence organizational issues,
1990-present" and its omission of these commissions from both the original
JIR and the ERRATA print. Perhaps, the footnote is a sloppy reference to the
"Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.N. Response, 1983-
200 1." JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at App. 5-49.
124. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 2 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 2.
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enforcement of consistent priorities for the collection, analysis,
and dissemination of intelligence throughout the Intelligence
Community;" 127 (2) "setting of policy and the ability to move
personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community;" 128 (3)
"review, approval, modification, and primary management and
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community budgets"; 29
(4) "review, approval, modification, and primary management and
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community personnel
and resource allocations"; 30 (5) "review, approval, modification,
and primary management and oversight of the execution of
Intelligence Community research and development efforts";' 3' (6)
"review, approval, and coordination of relationships between the
Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence and law
enforcement services"; 132 and (7) "exercise of statutory authority to
insure that Intelligence Community agencies and components
fully comply with community-wide policy, management, spending,
and administrative guidance and priorities."133  The JIR,
moreover, as part of the proposed establishment of this new super-
coordinating management czardom, suggests that "[t]o insure
focused and consistent Intelligence Community leadership,
Congress should require that no person may simultaneously serve
as both the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the director of any other
specific intelligence agency." 34
A second important proposal for statutory or budgetary
changes suggested by the Joint Inquiry Report concerns a new
national security institution. According to the JIR: "Congress and
the Administration should ensure the full development within the
Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source
terrorism information fusion center" 35 (IFC), with the goal that
this novel organizational innovation "will dramatically improve
the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3.
135. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both
within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence
Community. 136  Despite its highfalutin name, the essential
purpose of the "all-source terrorism information fusion center"
appears to be the creation of a centralized intelligence agency.
(Why, then, do we need both a CIA and an IFC?)137
The Joint Inquiry Report offers a third suggested statutory or
budgetary action in the nature of oversight hearings. The JIR
states in this regard:
The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary
Committees should continue to examine the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation...
particularly with respect to changes made as a result of
136. Id.
137. According to the JIR, the "information fusion center" (IFC) should be
given legal authority and resources needed to:
* have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related
intelligence information, including "raw" supporting data as
needed;
* have the ability to participate fully in the existing
requirements process for tasking the Intelligence
Community to gather information on foreign individuals,
entities and threats;
* integrate such information in order to identify and assess
the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United
States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities;
" implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced
analytical tools, consistent with applicable law;
* retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled
analysts, supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on
"joint tours" from the various Intelligence Community
agencies;
* institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all
the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post lead
information for use by analysts at other agencies without
waiting for dissemination of a formal report;
" maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills
through regular use of analysis and language training
programs; and
* establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of
counterterrorism-related information with federal agencies
outside the Intelligence Community as well as with state
and local authorities.
Id. at 5-6.
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the USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent decision of
the United States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review,
to determine whether its provisions adequately address
present and emerging terrorist threats to the United
States. Legislation should be proposed by those
Committees to remedy any deficiencies identified as a
result of that review. 138
As a fourth statutory or budgetary suggestion following up on
other proposals for centralization and coordination, 139 the JIR
suggests that "Congress should consider enacting legislation,
modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the
concept of 'jointness' throughout the Intelligence Community."140
As revealed in the supporting language of this recommendation,
the JIR appears to be simply calling for more, good-old-fashioned
American teamwork:
By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint
career speciality, increased authority for regional
commanders, and joint exercises [the Goldwater-Nichols
Act of 19861 greatly enhanced the joint warfighting
capabilities of the individual military services.
Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the
Intelligence Community could help improve management
of Community resources and priorities and insure a far
more effective "team" effort by all the intelligence
agencies.14'
138. Id. at 9-10.
139. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
140. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 11.
141. Id. The JIR recommendation continues by stating:
The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive
use of "joint tours" for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement
personnel to broaden their experience and help bridge existing
organizational and cultural divides through service in other
agencies. These joint tours should include not only service at
Intelligence Community agencies, but also service in those agencies
that are users or consumers of intelligence products. Serious
incentives for joint services should be established throughout the
Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint
service with career advancement credit at individual agencies. The
Director of National Intelligence should also require Intelligence
Community agencies to participate in joint exercises[.]
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Fifth, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends expansion and
improvement of "existing educational grant programs focused on
intelligence-related fields, similar to military scholarship
programs" as a statutory and budgetary measure. 142
As a sixth statutory/budgetary suggestion, the JIR
recommends that "Congress should ... review the statutes,
policies and procedures that govern the national security
classification of intelligence information and its protection from
unauthorized disclosure." 143 Interestingly, as part of this proposal,
the JIR suggests that "[a]mong other matters, Congress should
consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used
in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat
environment has greatly increased the need for real-time sharing
of sensitive information. " 144 What does "real-time sharing" mean?
The most plausible interpretation appears to be the sharing of raw
intelligence data as soon as it is reasonably made available.
Another interpretation might be access to a web-based data source
where new intelligence information is regularly updated and
revised.
Finally, the Joint Inquiry Report indicates, as a seventh
statutory or budgetary modification to existing national
intelligence and security laws: "as part of the confirmation process
for Intelligence Community officials, Congress should require from
those officials an affirmative commitment to the implementation
and use of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the
Intelligence Community." 145 The language "strong accountability
mechanisms" reminds one of Orwellian-speak in his book 1984.146
A draconian image that comes to mind is the kind of
"accountability mechanism" practiced by Ian Fleming's character,
Goldfinger, when one of his agents has failed him-immediate
electrocution and disposal. 147  A less horrific "accountability
mechanism" might simply include being fired from one's job.
Nonetheless, as usual, the JIR utilizes congressional jargon to
Id. at 11-12.
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Id.
145. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15.
146. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet 1961) (1949).
147. See generally Ian Fleming's classic book, GOLDFINGER (1959).
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make its points.
B. Requested Reports from Executive Branch Agencies
Numerous requests for reports are interwoven throughout the
fabric of the Joint Inquiry Report's recommendations. First, the
JIR wants the president to "take action to ensure that clear,
consistent, and current priorities are established and enforced
throughout the Intelligence Community," and to make certain
that "[o]nce established, these priorities" are "reviewed and
updated" annually "to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence
Community resources reflect and effectively address the
continually evolving threat environment.." 148 Under separation of
powers principles, of course, Congress cannot command the
president to undertake his independent constitutional powers as
commander-in-chief 49 or as leader of the nation's conduct in
foreign affairs, 15 0 but the JIR apparently contemplates that
Congress could obtain access to the aforementioned intelligence
priorities information through Congress' power of the purse:151
"the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities.. .should
be reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees [by
the President] on an annual basis."15 2
Second, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends a raft of reports
from "the new Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security," to be issued to both Congress and the President "on a
date certain," and containing four specific matters: (1) an account
of "the FBI's progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing
the reforms required to conduct an effective domestic intelligence
program," including the "adequacy" of "domestic intelligence
authorities" regarding the pursui[t] [of] counterterrorism at home
and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights
guaranteed under the Constitution";153 (2) an analysis of "the
148. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3-4.
149. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
150. See id. at art. II, § 2, cls. 4-5.
151. See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
152. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 4.
153. Id. at 8. The JIR goes on to request, by way of a prominent example,
executive branch proposals on "whether the range of persons subject to
searches and su-veillances authorized under the Foreign Intelligence
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experience of other democratic nations in organizing the conduct
of domestic intelligence";154 (3) an appraisal of "the specific
manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be
established in the United States, recognizing the need to enhance
national security while fully protecting civil liberties";155 and the
somewhat repetitive request for a set of "recommendations on how
to best fulfill the nation's need for an effective domestic
intelligence capability, including necessary legislation."15 6
Third, the Joint Inquiry Report turns its attention to the
NSA, presently lodged within the Department of Defense (DOD),
seeking a "detailed plan," by June 30, 2003, to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, as well as to certain executive
branch officials, 57  which (1) describes solutions for the
technological changes for signals intelligence; (2) requires a
review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be delivered,
funding levels and schedules for every technology development
program; (3) ensures... accounting for program expenditures; (4)
makes NSA a full collaborating partner with the CIA and the FBI
in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the collection
and analytic capabilities of the NSA, CIA, and the FBI; and (5)
makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate these
goals. 15s
Fourth, the Joint Inquiry Report requests the State
Department, "in consultation with the Department of Justice," to
report to both "the President and the Congress by June 30, 2003
Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded." Id.
154. Id. Comparative law perspectives are usually helpful in pondering
the content and structure of legislation. But query: have the domestic
intelligence problems of the United States-the world's sole "super-power"
with the enmity of many groups from around the world-become sui generis?
Perhaps the experience of Israel in conducting its domestic intelligence would
be most apropos to the domestic intelligence program needed for the United
States in the post 9/11 era.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id.
157. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 10.
158. Id. The language used by the JIR is ambiguous and open to varying
interpretations. As a final shot over the bow of NSA, the JIR in conjunction
with the forthcoming requested report from NSA indicates as follows: "In
evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues pertaining to
whether civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of National
Security Agency and whether the term of service for the position should be
longer than it has been in the recent past." Id.
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on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and multilateral
agreements, including extradition and mutual assistance treaties,
would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts."159
Fifth, acknowledging the political reality of an independent
investigative entity outside of the institutional structure of
Congress brought about by the demands of relatives of 9/11
victims, 160 the JIR requests that this entity, "the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,"
undertake "and make recommendations concerning how Congress
may improve its oversight of the Intelligence Community," 161
including the following five policy and legal issues: (1) "changes in
the budgetary process"; (2) "changes in the rules regarding
membership on the [intelligence] oversight committees"; (3)
"whether oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint
House-Senate Committee or, as currently exists, in separate
Committees in each house"; (4) "the extent to which classification
decisions impair congressional oversight"; and (5) "how
Congressional oversight can best contribute to the continuing need
of the Intelligence Community to evolve and adapt to changes in
the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of
159. Id. at 13. Interestingly, the JIR wants the State Department review
to "address the degree to which current categories of extraditable offenses
should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa and immigration fraud,
which may be particularly useful against terrorists and those who support
them." Id.
160. See JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE 113 (2004) ("Because of
the lack of White House cooperation with the joint inquiry, the families of
9/11 victims began lobbying Congress to create an independent commission,
with subpoena power, to investigate 9/11, even before the congressional effort
had been completed"). Of course, the Joint Inquiry, acting through the
respective houses of Congress, could have subpoenaed all pertinent
documents that it wanted from the executive branch. See LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 216-30 (Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane eds., 2d ed. 2002) (discussing
compulsory process before congressional committees).
161. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 13. In July of 2004
the commission issued its report. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
This report "concluded in its unanimous final report... that the attacks were
a shock but they should not have come as a surprise." Philip Shenon, We Are
Not Safe: Commission Warns of Another Catastrophe Under Status Quo, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2004, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted). For an
account of the formation of the Commission because of the perceived lack of
success of the Joint Inquiry by Congress, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
INC., 2002 ALMANAC 7-18-7-19 (2003).
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policymakers."162
Sixth, concerned about what it perceived as the aggressive
use of classified information by the executive branch during the
course of its investigation-what Senator John McCain described
as the administration having "slow-walked and stonewalled" the
congressional inquiry163-the JIR makes the following remarkable
request:
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney
General, should review and report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals for a new
and more realistic approach to the processes and
structures that have governed the designation of sensitive
and classified information. The report should include
proposals to protect against the use of the classification
process as a shield to protect agency self-interest. 64
Seventh, alarmed that the Intelligence Community had
shrugged off responsibility for the terrorist attacks of September
11, the Joint Inquiry Report sought a report from the CIA director
"to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees no later than
June 30, 2003" regarding "the steps taken to implement a system
of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to
include processes for identifying poor performance and affixing
responsibility for it, and for recognizing and rewarding excellence
in performance." 165
As an eighth, and final, mandate for executive branch
reporting back to Congress, the JIR focused on the President:
The Administration should review and report to the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees by June 30,
2003 regarding what progress has been made in reducing
the inappropriate and obsolete barriers among
intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in
counterterrorism, what remains to be done to reduce
those barriers, and what legislative actions may be
162. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14.
163. DEAN, supra note 160.
164. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 15.
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advisable in that regard. In particular, this report should
address what steps are being taken to insure that
perceptions within the Intelligence Community about the
scope and limits of current law and policy with respect to
restrictions on collection and information sharing are, in
fact, accurate and well-founded. 166
C. Mandates for Executive Action
The final category of congressional recommendations in the
Joint Inquiry Report concerns suggestions (or demands) on
executive branch agencies. Ten calls for further executive action
can be discerned in the JIR:
* National Security Council-led and presidentially-approved
"U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism,
both at home and abroad, including the growing terrorism
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and associated technologies" with components
of the strategy to include "foreign policy, economic,
military, intelligence, and law enforcement elements that
are critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the
war against terrorism";167
166. Id. at 16. In what may be called an omnibus reporting mandate, the
following language appears at the close of the JIR's recommendations: "The
Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees of significant developments [regarding evidence of
state sponsored terrorism], through regular reports and additional
communications" with the expectation that "the [congressional] Committees
should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight of the
[Intelligence] Community's work in this critically important area." Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 4. The JIR goes on to specify how Congress would like this
national counterterrorism strategy to look including discussion of the
following:
* develop[ing] human sources to penetrate terrorist
organizations and networks both overseas and within the
United States;
* fully utilize[ing] existing and future technologies to better
exploit terrorist communications; to improve and expand
the use of data mining and other cutting edge analytical
tools; and to develop a multi-level security capability to
facilitate the timely and complete sharing of relevant
intelligence information both within the Intelligence
Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and
local authorities;
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" The creation of a "National Intelligence Officer for
Terrorism" within the "National Intelligence Council" who
would be "a highly qualified individual appointed to
prepare intelligence estimates on terrorism for the use of
Congress" and executive branch policymakers"; 168
* The implementation, by the FBI, of multiple measures to
improve the Bureau's conducting of domestic intelligence
by: better prioritization and enforcement of field office
compliance, developing independent career tracks for
counterterrorism, better training of strategic analysts,
establishing "a strong reports officer cadre at the FBI
Headquarters" to ensure better dissemination of agents to
analysts of key counterterrorism information, agent
training for better use of strategic analysis, recruitment of
agents with needed linguistic skills, increased penetration
of terrorist organizations operating within the United
States through "all available means of collection,"
improved "national security law training" by FBI
personnel, improved exchange of counterterrorism
information between the FBI and other federal, state and
local agencies, and remediation of "the FBI's persistent
and incapacitating information technology problems";169
* enhance[ing] the depth and quality of domestic intelligence
collection and analysis by, for example, modernizing current
intelligence reporting formats through the use of existing
information technology to emphasize the existence and the
significance of links between new and previously acquired
information;
" maximize[ing] the effective use of covert action in
counterterrorist efforts;
* develop[ing] programs to deal with financial support for
international terrorism; and
* facilitate[ing] the ability of CIA paramilitary units and
military special operations forces to conduct joint operations
against terrorist targets.
Id. at 4-5.
168. Id. at 5.
169. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 7-8.
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* The accomplishment by the Attorney General and the
Director of the FBI of expanded and improved intelligence
data obtained by an aggressive use of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act;170
* Transformation by the Intelligence Community led by the
Director of National Intelligence, of the ."recruitment and
development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and
expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts." 171
Greatly enhanced training programs should be launched
and carried out in the following areas: "information
sharing among law enforcement and intelligence
personnel; language capabilities; the use of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting";172
* Review and improvement under the direction of the
President, of the budgeting process of implementing
American counterterrorism policy including "consideration
of a separate classified Intelligence Community budget,"
flexible appropriations "subject to congressional oversight,
to enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to
altered or unanticipated needs"; and contracting for a
"rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the resources spent on
intelligence"; 173
" Consideration by the President of possible amendments to
"Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the
170. See id. at 9.
171. Id. at 10.
172. Id. at 11. One of the more intriguing specific congressional
recommendations is a "Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps" outside of the
Intelligence Community "whose abilities are relevant to the needs of
counterterrorism[.]" Id. Moreover, ever "politically correct" in its aspirations,
the JIR directs that:
the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more
ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to
capitalize upon the unique culture and linguistic capabilities of first-
generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize their skills to
the greatest practical effect, while recognizing the potential
counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose.
Id. at 12.
173. Id. at 12-13.
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national security classification of intelligence information"
with an eye toward "expand[ing] access to relevant
information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence
Community, for state and local authGrities, which are
critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American
public," while also reassessing existing presidential policy
"to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified
intelligence information"; 174
* Reviews by the "Inspectors General at the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of State" of the
factual findings of the JIR, coupled with further
independent internal reviews, "to determine whether and
to what extent personnel at all levels should be held
accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to
meet professional standards" dealing with "the
identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist
attacks, including the events of September 11, 2001";175
" Development, under direction of the President, of "a
national watch list center that will be responsible for
integrating all terrorist-related watch list systems," while
"ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist
names into the center from all relevant points of
collection";i7 6
* FBI and CIA coordination and "aggressive [e]" investigation
of "the possibility that foreign governments are providing
support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the
United States and U.S. interests."177
V. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JOINT INQUIRY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
A remarkable aspect of the Joint Inquiry Report is the
inclusion of some 190 pages of "[aidditional views."178 While the
174. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14.
175. Id. at 15-16.
176. Id. at 16.
177. Id.
178. See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, following page 435. The
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use of additional views in congressional committee reports is well
known,179 their significance is under-theorized. Are they in the
nature of judicial dissenting or concurring opinions? 80 Are they
mere grandstanding? A review of some of the eight separate
additional views filed by nine members18' of the Joint Inquiry will
touch on these questions. In general, taken as a whole and
considered together, these additional views highlight the multi-
flawed legal process of the Joint Inquiry.
A. Senator Richard C. Shelby
The most prominent of the additional views of the members of
the Joint Inquiry is the filing of Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL).
The prominence of Shelby's additional views is premised on two
reasons: (1) he is Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, is2 and (2) his views are spread out over 135
"additional views" are separately paginated. See id. Citation will be to the
separately titled, separately paginated authors' additional views. See infra
notes 185, 204, 206, 222, 225.
179. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 160, at 284-85.
180. Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A.
Posner's First Decade Dissenting Judicial Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward An
Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REV. 73 (2004). See also
CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
181. The additional views of members are as follows and appear in the
following order:
* Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL) (135 pages)
" Representative Michael N. Castle (R-DE) (2 pages)
" Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) (16 pages)
" Representative Jane Harman (D-CA) (5 pages)
" Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) (21
pages)
" Senator Carl Levin (D-MN) (3 pages)
• Senator Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) (3 pages)
* Representative Tim Roemer (D-IN) (5 pages)
See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, (separately paginated additional
views attached to the JIR). A total of seventeen U.S. Senators and members
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were part of the Joint Inquiry.
See id. at viii. A total of twenty U.S. Representatives and members of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were part of the Joint
Inquiry. See id. at ix. Therefore, nine out of thirty-seven (or about twenty-
four percent) of the Joint Inquiry members filed additional views.
182. See id. at viii.
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pages. 183 Moreover, in a recent book, Shelby was quoted as saying
this about the difficulty encountered in obtaining information
during the Joint Inquiry: "You know, we were told that there
would be cooperation in this investigation and I question that,"
noting, "I think that most of the information that our staff has
been able to get [from the executive branch] has had to be
extracted piece by piece."'184
Shelby's additional views contain several acerbic nuggets.
First, drawing a historical parallel between the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001 and the "devastating surprise attack the
United States suffered at Japanese hands at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941," Shelby urges the case for fundamental reform,
stating that "too much has happened for us to be able to conclude
that the American people and our national security interests can
be protected simply by throwing more resources at agencies still
fundamentally wedded to the pre-September 11 status quo."185
Second, speaking of the structure and organization of the
American Intelligence Community, Shelby lambasts the Director
of Central Intelligence's "at least partly rhetorical 1998
declaration of 'war' against Al Qaeda," and criticizes "the
centrifugal tendencies of bureaucratic politics" within the
Intelligence Community with the upshot that the Community
"responds too slowly and too disjointedly to shifting threats."186 In
this regard, he urges "organizational flexibility"187 and "a
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. DEAN, supra note 160, at 113 (footnote omitted).
185. SEN. RICHARD C. SHELBY, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF
REFORM IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR
RICHARD C. SHELBY, VICE CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE 3 (Dec. 10, 2002) [hereinafter SHELBY].
186. Id. at 4. In partial support of his reference to centrifugal tendencies,
Shelby observed: "The most obvious problem with respect to the IC's
[Intelligence Committee's] ability to act as a coherent and effective whole is
the fact that more than 80 percent of its budgets and personnel resources are
controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD)." Id. at 4.
187. Id. at 28. He elaborated on this point by observing:
This is what might be called the "meta-lesson" of our current round
of "lessons learned" studies of intelligence failures: we must not only
learn the lessons of the past but learn how to keep learning lessons
as we change and adapt in the future. Adopting uniform personnel
standards would help the Community ensure that its personnel and
organizational units remain unique and valuable individual
resources but they would also become administratively fungible
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continual process of 'creative destruction' not unlike competitive
corporate approaches used in the private sector."ss
Third, focusing on information-sharing concerns, Shelby goes
to considerable lengths in his additional views to critique the
Intelligence Community's failure to "connect the dots" before
9/11;189 to describe the systemic and continual problems of
information within the Intelligence Community; 190  and to
enthusiastically encourage future breakthroughs in innovative
techniques of information sharing.19' Highlighting the paramount
intelligence sharing failures that he believes the Joint Inquiry's
investigation revealed, Shelby opines at length:
The CIA's chronic failure, before September 11, to share
with other agencies the names of known al-Qa'ida
terrorists who it knew to be in the country allowed at
least two such terrorists the opportunity to live, move,
and prepare for the attacks without hindrance from the
very federal officials whose job it is to find them. Sadly,
the CIA seems to have concluded that the maintenance of
its information monopoly was more important tha[n]
stopping terrorists from entering or operating within the
United States. Nor did the FBI fare much better, for even
when notified in the so-called "Phoenix Memo" of the
danger of al-Qa'ida flight school training, its agents failed
to understand or act upon this information in the broader
context of information the FBI already possessed about
terrorist efforts to target or use U.S. civil aviation. The
CIA watchlisting and FBI Phoenix stories illustrate both
the potential of sophisticated information-sharing and
good information-empowered analysis and the perils of
failing to share information promptly and efficiently
between (and within) organizations. They demonstrate
the need to ensure that intelligence analysis is conducted
on a truly "all-source" basis by experts permitted to
assets, capable of being reorganized and redirected efficiently as
circumstances demand.
Id.
188. Id. at 29.
189. Id. at 33-46.
190. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 47-51.
191. Id. at 52-70.
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access all relevant information-no matter where in the
IC [Intelligence Community] it happens to reside.192
Fourth, Senator Shelby's additional views raise some useful
points about intelligence-law enforcement coordination. "The
September 11 story," as he puts it, "illustrates the tremendous
problems of coordination between U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence entities that developed out of a long series of
misunderstandings, timorous lawyering, and mistaken
assumptions."193 Even after 9/11 and the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001,194 which amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA),' 95 Shelby expresses frustrations that "[i]t
took over a year... for the USA PATRIOT Act changes to
penetrate the U.S. Government's entrenched 'no coordination'
bureaucratic culture."196 Furthermore, in Shelby's view, "[i]t was
not until November 2002 thaft the FISA Court of Review-the
never before-used appellate body created by the statute-issued
an opinion" overruling the FISA trial court that "the law...
stands today where Congress intended it to stand" in passing the
USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001: "there is no restriction upon
coordination between law enforcement and intelligence organs in
connection with FISA surveillance or physical searches, and such
activity can lawfully be undertaken even if primarily done with
prosecutorial intent, provided that a 'significant' intelligence
purpose remains."197
Fifth, in strong language of rebuke, Senator Shelby castigates
the domestic intelligence failures of the FBI leading up to
September 11, 2001, concluding that the FBI's "organizational and
institutional culture is terribly flawed," and that the FBI "is
fundamentally incapable, in its present form, of providing
Americans with the security they require against foreign terrorist
and intelligence threats."198
192. Id. at 6-7.
193. Id. at 8.
194. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 252 (Oct. 26, 2001).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. (Supp. 2005).
196. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 86.
197. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 10. He went on to contend:
In light of the FBI's dismal recent history of disorganization and
institutional incompetence in its national security work, many of us
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Sixth, Shelby's take on the CIA's pre-9/11 human intelligence
performance is caustic. As he sees it, the CIA "has been too
reluctant to develop non-traditional" forms of human-collected
intelligence and "has stuck too much and for too long with the
comparatively easy work of operating under diplomatic cover from
U.S. embassies."199
Seventh, regarding the topic of covert action, Senator Shelby
comments:
[G]iven the unpleasant history of covert action scandals
that have affected the CIA, one should not be surprised to
find that-ironically, perhaps-the covert action
infrastructure is a relatively cautious one. Intelligence
officers will often, and with good reason, hesitate to take
operational risks or to push aggressively to accomplish
their missions if they are operating under ambiguous or
convoluted legal authorities and always suspect that they
may be prosecuted or hauled before a hostile inquiry for
any actual or perceived missteps.200
Finally, Shelby offers separate remarks to the Joint Inquiry
Report on the subject of accountability, "respectfully disagree[ing]"
with the view, offered by some officials, that Congress "should
postpone holding anyone accountable within the Intelligence
Community until [the] war against al-Qa'ida is completed."21 As
Shelby puts it: "Precisely because we face a grave and ongoing
threat, we must begin reforming the [Intelligence] Community
in Congress have begun to consider whether it might better serve the
interests of the American people to separate the counterintelligence
and counterterrorism functions of the [FBI] into an entirely separate
organization-one that would be free of the structural,
organizational, and cultural constraints that have greatly
handicapped the FBI's ability to conduct the domestic intelligence
work our country depends upon it to perform.
Id. at 98-99.
199. Id. at 12.
200. Id. at 129. A significant reason for this covert action timidity, from
Shelby's perspective, was a history, during the Clinton Administration, of
legal authorizations contained in presidential Memoranda of Notifications
(MONs) "as to what [covert] agents are permitted to do in pursuit of the
stated aim-with absolute clarity." Id. (footnote citing Joint Inquiry
testimony of former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger).
201. SHELBY, supra note 185, at 13.
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immediately."202 Speaking in a voice of agitated dissent, Shelby
employs understated outrage in the failure of the Joint Inquiry to
assess specific blame for the 9/11 disaster:
The metaphor of "war" is instructive, for wise generals do
not hesitate to hold their subordinates accountable while
the battle still rages, disciplining or cashiering those who
fail to do their duty. So also do wise Presidents dispose of
their faltering generals under fire. Indeed, failures in
wartime are traditionally considered less excusable, and
are punished more severely, than failures in times of
peace.
Nor should we forget that accountability has two sides. It
is also a core responsibility of all good leaders to reward
those who perform well, and promote them to positions of
ever greater responsibility.
For these reasons, it is disappointing to me that despite
the Joint Inquiry's explicit mandate to "lay a basis for
assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of
government" and despite its extensive findings
documenting recurring and widespread [Intelligence]
Community shortcomings in the months and years
leading up to September 11, the Joint Inquiry has not
seen fit to identify any of the individuals whose decisions
left us so unprepared. I urge President Bush to examine
the Joint Inquiry's findings in order to determine the
extent to which he has been well served by his "generals"
in the Intelligence Community.203
B. Representative Mike Castle
Representative Mike Castle (R-DE) filed the functional
equivalent of a short concurring opinion to the Joint Inquiry
Report, focusing on two issues that he sought to highlight: (1) the
need for significant improvement in the performance of the NSA
202. Id.
203. Id. 13-14.
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in obtaining better signal intelligence concerning global terrorism,
and (2) the need for substantial, immediate reform "with respect
to the management, coordination and oversight of our Nation's
visa program."20 4
Castle's more telling comments concern the matter of visa
reform. Alarmingly, as he explains:
The majority of the September 1 1 th hijackers were
wrongly admitted to the United States-in violation of
U.S. immigration laws-as a result of decisions made and
errors committed by responsible State Department and
Justice Department officers. The fact that many of them
entered and operated in true name, further emphasizes
the extent to which the current system is broken.20 5
C. Senator Mike DeWine
Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) crafted his separate remarks in
the form of a partial concurring opinion and partial dissent from
the Joint Inquiry Report.20 6 Even on those few points where he
seems to be going against the grain of the JIR, DeWine's
dissenting comments are collaborative in nature.20 7
DeWine makes seven key arguments. First, he asserts that it
was vital for the Intelligence Committees of Congress to "improve
the quality and quantity of oversight" with regard to executive
branch agencies seeking secret authorization pursuant to FISA to
conduct domestic intelligence. 20 8
204. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE CASTLE, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
MIKE CASTLE (R-DELEWARE) TO BE APPENDED TO THE REPORT OF THE JOINT
INQUIRY ON THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED
STATES 1 (Dec. 2002).
205. Id. at 1-2.
206. See SENATOR MIKE DEWINE, ADDITIONAL COMMENTS JOINT INQUIRY
STAFF REPORT 1 (Dec. 18, 2002) [hereinafter DEWINE].
207. Id. at 2. Cf Blomquist, supra note 180, at 91-92 (discussing the
concept of a collaborative versus an oppositional judicial dissenting opinion).
208. DEWINE, supra note 206, at 2. Senator DeWine's suggestions for
additional congressional oversight activities are incisive and perspicacious.
He proposes, for example:
[T]he Intelligence Committees [of Congress] should hold regularly
scheduled hearings to examine the FISA process and receive
testimony from senior [executive branch] officials .... These
hearings should explore the FISA process and provide information as
20051
58 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:1
Second, in an intriguing proposal, DeWine suggests the need
for improving the FISA process by requiring the appointment, by
the secret court .administering the statute, of "advocates" chosen
from a group of "pre-cleared attorneys with prior FISA
experience" 2 9 who, while not contacting or informing "the subject
of the potential surveillance," would, instead, "act as officers of the
[secret] court, representing the legal position in opposition to the
Justice Department's application for a FISA warrant."210
Third, Senator DeWine parts company with the JIR's
recommendation to create a separate position of Director of
National Intelligence, untethered from the CIA, observing that a
number of experts had concluded that this institutional isolation
would be "counterproductive."211 Fourth, he urges the need to
emphasize that "the Intelligence Community needs to pay more
attention to the collection and analysis of open-source
information" derived from available unclassified information-
such as a report, written in 1999, by a Library of Congress analyst
regarding the risk of Al Qaeda suicide bombers flying airplanes
into places like the White House and the Pentagon.21 2
Fifth, DeWine opines that the "Senate and House Intelligence
Committees are asking for too many unnecessary reports" from
members of the Intelligence Community.2 3
Sixth, he offers an innovative potential technique to enhance
information-sharing among members of the sprawling and diverse
to how FISA is being implemented. For example, in order to better
determine how the Executive Branch is utilizing FISA, the
Committee should examine the number of FISA warrants issued
during a given period of time and the general subject matter or
issues those warrants were meant to address. Furthermore, these
hearings should be used to explore a wide range of hypothetical
situations-situations based on actual cases that demonstrate to
[Congress] ... how the law would be applied in certain scenarios.
This would allow [Congress] to develop a better understanding of
how FISA is being implemented in a practical, day-to-day manner
and also alert [Congress] to any instances where the [relevant
intelligence entities are] departing from Congressional intent.
Id. at 3.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id. at 4 n.2.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id. at 6.
213. DEWINE, supra note 206, at 6.
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American Intelligence Community. 214 According to DeWine:
A relatively simple way to address this would be through
the use of a technology known as "multi-level security"
capability. Basically, the use of multi-level security
allows computer users with different levels of security
classification to get different levels of access to
information contained and stored in a comprehensive
intelligence database. In other words, database users
would be able to access only the information in the
database that their security clearances allowed them to
view.
This would allow the myriad of intelligence agencies to
safely combine all of their databases, including those
containing the most sensitive data and make the entire
combined database accessible to a wide range of
intelligence and law enforcement personnel, without
sacrificing security for the most highly classified data.
For example, a detective in Cincinnati who notices
unusual activity around city hall could do a search of the
comprehensive Community-wide database for "city halls
in Ohio" and come up with some non-classified FBI
information about possible attacks on city halls around
the state or in other states. He then would get a
notification from the system that there was more
information about the topic, but that it was classified at a
level above his clearance. At that point, he could go to his
supervisor and begin the process of having that
information sent to someone within the department who
has the appropriate level of clearance. This would help
resolve one of the many information-sharing problems
facing the Intelligence Community.215
Finally, Senator DeWine's separate filing contains a
thoughtful and in-depth scenario for changing the existing
American Intelligence Community's "[bi roken [c] orporate
[c]ulture," which is risk-averse, rather than prudently risk-
214. Id. at 7.
215. Id. An obvious potential problem with this particular idea, however,
is securing the combined intelligence database against computer hackers.
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taking.216 From his perspective: "A new organization must be
built from the ground up as a small, agile, and adaptive
organization with a corporate culture of taking prudent risks."217
Moreover, it would have a limited list of targets: terrorists,
proliferators, and 'rogue states."' 218 And its operations, according
to DeWine, would emphasize "non-official operations or NOC's" 219
unaffiliated with any official U.S. government "cover" job220 and
operating over long stretches of time with considerable
autonomy. 221
D. Representative Jane Harman
Representative Jane Harman (D-CA) offers a few nuggets of
concurring insights which enlarge on the Joint Inquiry Report.
First, she points out that the JIR recommendation for creating a
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would "empower" this
official "to lead the [Intelligence Community] by pairing authority
with responsibility."222 By way of comparison, Harman points out
that the Director of Central Intelligence "currently lacks the
statutory authority" to provide "a coherent approach across
agencies and overarching leadership." 223
Second, offering a lighter touch than the tone of the Joint
Inquiry Report, Representative Harman opines that while "[t]he
investigation revealed that significant intelligence leads about
some of the hijackers were available but did not get widely
shared," this lapse "was less a willful refusal to share information
than it was a failure to grasp its significance." 224
216. Id. at 8.
217. Id.
218. DEWINE, supra note 208, at 8.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 8-15. As explained by DeWine, this might include
attendance at a radical Islamic mosque in the U.S., allowing the American
operative to travel abroad, receiving training at a terrorist camp and to
"infiltrate organizations like al Qaeda." Id. at 14.
222. REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT ADDITIONAL
VIEWS 1 (December 2002).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2. In this regard, she went on to note that the "raw databases"
of many American intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA "contain
extremely valuable information that does not get noticed, shared, integrated,
or acted upon." Id.
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E. Senator Jon Kyl & Senator Pat Roberts
In what is, in effect, a joint dissenting opinion from the JIR,
Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Pat Roberts (R-KS) divide their
concerns into three major headings: (1) "[tlhe [n]eed for
[a]dditional [v]iews," 225 (2) "[d]efficiencies in the [rleport," 226 and
(3) "[c]omments on [r]ecommendations." 227
1. A Perspective on Process
We gain a valuable insider's peek on the Joint Inquiry process
from the perspective of two relatively junior and conservative U.S.
Senators. They begin their dissenting statement with a lament
about how the content of the Joint Inquiry Report was assembled.
Thus, by examining their opening salvo, we can discern that they
were displeased with the way the staff and the combined
committee's leadership controlled things. They complain:
The Report is a product of the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS),
not the Senators and the Representatives who sit,
respectively, on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the SSCI and the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the HPSCI (the "Big Four") made
most decisions and supervised the JIS. The JIS should be
commended for putting together the first official account
of events leading up to the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001.
It is difficult, however, for rank-and-file Members of the
two Committees to know how thorough or accurate the
Report is because of the way the JIS and the "Big Four"
conducted the inquiry, withholding information and
decisions from the Members and SSCI and HPSCI staff
throughout the process. While the Report should be a
useful historical document on which to base further
225. SENATOR JON KYL & SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF
REPORT ADDITIONAL VIEWS 1 (December 2002) [hereinafter KYL & ROBERTS].
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id. at 20.
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inquiries, we cannot vouch for its contents. 228
A second process-pique of Kyl and Roberts is that reasons why
mistakes were made by the Intelligence Community were not
emphasized. They note:
After prodding by several Senators, some underlying
causes of these failures were identified, but even then,
they were not further probed to determine what might
have been done differently. And the fact that the
prodding was necessary illustrates our concern that the
JIS either ran out of time or did not have the inclination
or instruction to examine, for instance, why U.S.
government agencies were risk-averse, who is responsible
for the inadequate resources devoted to counter-terrorism
efforts, why legal authorities were so confusing, and why
leadership was so lacking. Without this examination, the
Report will be of limited value in determining "lessons
learned."229
Fascinating stuffl But there is more process vitriol.
Third, Senators Kyl and Roberts groused that the Joint
Inquiry process "was conducted and overseen in a way that left
rank-and-file members at a distinct disadvantage, and left
insufficient time to examine many relevant issues."230 In this
regard, they grumble that the voluminous final draft of the JIR
"was delivered to Members four days before the one and only
meeting scheduled for its consideration, when most Members were
out of town." 231 Moreover, they gripe that "[t]here was no debate
about the Report, only the Recommendations. But there was little
basis for debate since the product was strictly the work of the
JIS-more like an Inspector General's report than a typical
congressional committee report."232  Roberts and Kyl provide
numerous details of what they perceived to be serious defects in
the Joint Inquiry process that were labeled by the senators as
"irregularities." 233 These included the following:
228. Id. at 1.
229. Id.
230. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 1-2.
231. Id. at 2.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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" "Upon instructions from the Chairmen-and in violation of
SSCI rules-the JIS often failed to tell Members and staff
of important non-compartmented information it discovered
in a timely manner."234
" "Information relating to open hearings-such as the JIS
staff statement and witness statements-were routinely
provided only late on the night before the hearing."235
" "Committee staff and sometimes even the staff directors,
were often excluded from meetings of the "Big Four", whose
decisions were often made without consultation. Members'
liaison staff, and, therefore, the Members themselves, were
in the dark about these decisions."236
A fourth key process failure noted by the joint separate
statement of Senators Kyl and Roberts deals with the holding of
open hearings by the Joint Inquiry during the Autumn of 2002.
As extensively explained by these gentlemen:
The holding of open hearings was particularly
frustrating. The decision to hold them was apparently
made by the "Big Four" despite the concerns of the JIS
and objections of other Senators. The JIS was forced to
focus on them for three months, and from there had to go
right into drafting the Report in order to meet the year-
end deadline.
Several Members voiced their opposition to holding open
hearings before the investigative work was completed and
the Report written (and, we had supposed agreed to). We
objected, mostly in closed committee business meetings,
that it was premature to convene open hearings before
the investigation was complete. And indeed, at the point
when the JIS began preparing for them (July, 2002), its
investigations into the causes of 9/11 largely ground to a
halt. Due to dramatic media leaks and the potential for
234. Id.
235. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 2.
236. Id.
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further compromise, intelligence agencies "pushed back"
against open hearings, causing further friction with the
JIS investigation.
The hearings distracted these agencies, our "front line
troops" on the war on terrorism, and they distracted
Members and congressional staff from our traditional
oversight responsibilities. They also, in our view...
publicly revealed a lot of sensitive information from
which our enemies could profit. Most of the information
presented had already been revealed in closed hearings
which were far more productive because those who
participated could delve freely into classified information.
Key figures in our counter-terrorism efforts were
unnecessarily compromised by these public hearings.
We should have been more circumspect about publicly
releasing results before the investigation was complete
and the two intelligence committees had had a chance to
adequately review the final Report. 237
2. Claimed Deficiencies in the JIR
Senators Kyl and Roberts explicitly link the previously-
discussed process failures 238  to a resulting substantive
Congressional report "that falls well short of addressing the core
problems that led to 9/11." 239 They confidently assert in support
of this conclusion: "Because the fundamental problems that led to
9/11 are almost certainly rooted in poor policy and inadequate
leadership, the investigation should have delved more deeply into
conflicting interpretations of legal authorities (including
presidential directives), budget allocations, institutional attitudes,
and other key areas." 240 As they explain in other words, "only
such a thorough exercise will help us to make sure the failures [of
237. Id. at 3-4.
238. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
239. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 4.
240. Id.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
American counterterrorism policy] are not repeated."241
Continuing to build on this assertion, the two senators observe
that "[wihat best shows the tendency of the JIS investigations to
go to the water's edge but no farther is that, in the Report, there is
a pronounced tendency to identify problems as 'facts,' or 'realities,'
rather than as matters to be plumbed for underlying causes." 242
The example provided here is staff analysis that does not dig for
the root causes of why the CIA did not make efforts to penetrate
terrorist havens in Afghanistan and why the Pentagon did not
attempt a "comprehensive response" to the terrorist bombings of
American embassies in Africa in 1998 or the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole in 2000.243
The additional views of Senators Kyl and Roberts highlight
five additional substantive deficiencies of the Joint Inquiry Report
analysis and discussion: (a) "[r]isk [a]version," 244 (b) "[i]nsufficient
[r]esources, 245  (c) "[a] [filawed [I] egall[i] nstitutional
[flramework, 246  (d) "[1]eadership [f]ailures, 247  and (e) the
"[i] nadequate [s] cope" 248 of the JIR.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 4-5.
244. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 5-8 (discussing a "legacy of
caution" at key American intelligence agencies dealing with official concern
about past congressional criticisms of civil liberties violations and a cultural
ethos that was afraid to make mistakes).
245. Id. at 8-13 (discussing the "contradiction between high-ranking
officials' complaints about inadequate resources and the fact that, according
to the Office Management and Budget, the intelligence agencies usually got
what they asked for").
246. Id. at 13-15 (criticizing ambiguous legal materials from presidential
decision directives to the FISA statute).
247. Id. at 15-17. They note:
al Qaeda's attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long
period of poor leadership at the highest levels of the U.S.
Government regarding terrorism. Despite repeated assaults on the
United States and its interests-the 1993 World Trade Center
attack, the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, to name a
few-the U.S. Government was still unwilling to treat terrorism as a
true national security issue until 9/11.
Id.
248. Id. at 17-20 (criticizing the failure of the JIR to fully discuss the
failure of the U.S. State Department to deny visa access by 15 of the 19
hijackers from Saudi Arabia).
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3. Criticism of JIR Recommendations
The Kyl-Roberts statement closes with two specific criticisms
of the JIR recommendations and a general summary criticism of
the failing of the JIR process. First, they dismiss the notion that
an "intelligence czar" would be able to "succeed where the Director
of Central Intelligence has not." 249 Second, they object to the
Joint Inquiry Report's recommendation "calling for lower-level
personnel to be held accountable by the various agencies'
Inspectors General" instead of pursuing "[aiccountability of those
at the very top" which would, in turn, "produce[ ] accountability at
the intervening levels, and among officers in the field who run
down leads to find terrorists." 250 Finally, Senators Kyl and
Roberts conclude: "Our duty to understand precedes our ability to
improve. The [JIR], in not fully coming to terms with what
produced the intelligence failures it identified, left that duty
unfulfilled."251
VI. CONGRESS AND THE ART OF OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM
POLICY
A. Congress' Constitutional Role of Executive Oversight
Relatively little has been written on Congress' constitutional
responsibility to oversee the executive branch. Most
commentators who have considered the subject have focused on
the need to counterbalance the extraordinary power of the
President and his executive branch officials in implementing and
interpreting laws passed by Congress, the responsibility of
Congress to assure that publicly appropriated funds are spent
wisely and effectively and according to the intent of Congress, and
the salutary effects of publicizing government operations in a free
society. 252
Oversight by Congress of executive branch operations stems
249. KYL & ROBERTS, supra note 225, at 20.
250. Id. at 21.
251. Id.
252. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional and interactive
problems of the congressional oversight of the executive branch, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 203-10 (2000).
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from the broad constitutional grant of "[a]ll legislative powers" to
Congress, 253 made more specific by the interconnected all-
encompassing web of Article I, Sections 8 and 9 powers dealing
with the funding and structuring of executive activities.254
B. The Lost Art of Congressional Oversight
While the tradition of vigorous congressional oversight of
executive branch operations goes back in time more than 200
years, 255 in recent decades there has been an "erosion of Congress'
253. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.
254. Id. at art. I, § 8, art. I § 9.
255. David Nather, Congress As Watchdog: Asleep on the Job?, 62 CONG.
QUART. WKLY 1190, 1190-93 (May 22, 2004). Prominent instances of past
congressional oversight investigations include: the 1792 inquiry on the
Indian attacks on American troops-the first congressional oversight
inquiry-by a select House committee investigating the circumstances of an
attack that killed about 600 U.S. troops commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur St.
Clair, id. at 1190; the first joint House-Senate investigative panel, conducted
from December 1861 through May 1865, that examined "past and future
battle plans, disloyal employees, navy installations, and war supplies and
contracts" (considered "the worst-run congressional inquiry until the
McCarthy hearings of the 1950s"), id.; the Financial Trusts investigation
from February 1912 to February 1913 by a House Banking and Currency
subcommittee looking into "the concentration of money and credit, especially
the control exercised by two New York banks," with the "panel's report
help[ing] [the] enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913" among other
legislation; id.; the investigations by the Senate Subcommittee on Public
Lands and Surveys and the Senate Select Committee to Investigate the
Justice Department, during 1923-24, into the "lease of naval oil reserves,
including one called Teapot Dome under a Wyoming rock formation by the
Harding Administration," id. at 1190-91; the Defense Programs inquiry by
the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program,
during March 1941 to April 1948 (viewed as "the most effective congressional
investigation ever") into "the status of national defenses to a more specific
review of war mobilization problems, shortages of critical materials such as
aluminum, and fraud among contractors and lobbyists," id. at 1191; the
Kefauver Crime Hearings, from May 1950 to Summer 1951, being the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce,
which was "the first congressional hearings to draw the rapt attention of
television viewers across the nation as prominent gangsters and underworld
leaders were paraded in front of the panel," id.; the McCarthy Investigations,
from January 1953 to December 1954, as the Senate Government Operations
Committee's Permanent Investigations Committee conducted "a sweeping
array of probes of purported communist subversion of the U.S. government
and the United Nations," id. at 1191-92; the Watergate Hearings, during
January 1973 to July 1974 of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities and the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment
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oversight skills" and inclination to investigate executive
operations. 256 Possible causes for this diminished effectiveness of
congressional oversight include the packed schedules and shorter
workweeks of Senators and Members of Congress, term limits on
chairmanships of congressional committees, less funds for
investigative staff, the hard-work and low-payoff of traditional
oversight by legislators, the higher priority given by legislators to
constituent services and legislative work, and political-pressure to
go easy on the executive branch during a time of same-party
control of Congress and the White House since George W. Bush
became President in January 2001.257
With regard to the combined Senate-House Joint Inquiry into
the September 11 terrorist attacks, knowledgeable observers
contend that Congress has been "outperformed" by the National
Commission on terrorist attacks. 258  One commentator has
concluded that the independent commission, turned over to
commissioners outside of Congress: "has pried more disclosures
about the 2001 terrorist attacks" than the congressional Joint
Inquiry and "generated enough public pressure to force national
security advisor Condoleeza Rice to testify publicly, and Bush and
Vice President Dick Cheney to brief the panel in private-all
witnesses that the congressional" Joint Inquiry "never heard
from."259  Another observer, commenting on the seventeen
preliminary staff reports written by the independent commission
on 9/11, noted in implicit criticism to the congressional Joint
Inquiry Report:
In contrast to the plodding or self-promoting style of so
many government documents, the staff reports of the
commission investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks
inquiry into President Richard M. Nixon's illegal activities, id. at 1192; the
Senate "Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities," from January 1975 to April 1976, chaired by Senator
Frank Church (D-Idaho), focusing on the CIA's domestic spying activities
during the Vietnam War and leading to the formation of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, id. at 1192-93; and the Iran Contra hearings,
from November 1986 to August 1987, before the jointly-convened House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, id. at 1193.
256. Id. at 1191.
257. Id. at 1191-94.
258. Id. at 1193.
259. Id.
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have provided something truly rare in official
Washington: a good read.
In 17 crisply worded reports, the commission staff laid
out facts from the events that shook and marred the lives
of millions. Using a style that is remarkably free of
artifice, the authors achieved a high point in detail,
clarity and coherence. 260
C. Improving Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism
The conventional wisdom is that because of the profound
distrust between Republicans and Democrats in Congress there
exists "political paralysis" to conduct effective congressional
oversight of executive counterterrorism activities and to
implement the type of structural changes needed to improve post-
September 11 national security.261 As this line of thinking goes,
until the voters decide to create divided government between
Congress and the Presidency, nothing much will happen to change
the culture of counterterrorism policy in the CIA, the FBI, and the
Pentagon. 262 Perhaps this is correct. But looking to the long-term,
there are some institutional improvements that Congress should
consider.
1. Consolidate Intelligence Functions
"Jurisdiction over the various intelligence agencies and their
budgets is currently divided among a number of committees" in
both the House and the Senate.263 Keeping up on the oceanic flow
of twentieth century counterterrorism policy requires focus. "If
lawmakers are going to try to consolidate the government's
intelligence gathering operations, as they should, they can set a
good example by taking on the turf battles within their own ranks
first."264
260. Christopher Marquis, Reports On Attacks Are Gripping, Not Dry,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, at A23.
261. See Helen Fessenden, Intelligence Panels' Mission Corroded by Air of
Distrust, 62 CONG. QUART. WKLY. 730 (Mar. 27, 2004).
262. Id. at 733.
263. Editorial, Wake Up the Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A26.
264. Id. See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21
(recommending consolidation of congressional oversight over
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2. Foster Intelligence Expertise
Under current congressional rules, individual members of the
intelligence committees "may serve only a prescribed term."265
This procedural restriction "was adopted in the 1970s to prevent
lawmakers from being co-opted by the" executive branch's
intelligence agencies. 266 In practice, however, members of the
House and Senate are "driven from the committees just as they
develop the necessary expertise to become.., good overseer[s] of
the intelligence community."267 As a related reform, the House
and the Senate "should consider limiting the number of other
positions that the leaders of the intelligence committees may hold
to make sure that they have all the time needed for their
responsibilities." 268
3. Experiment with More Decentralized and Indirect Forms of
Intervention
While centralized statutory and budgetary changes in
American executive branch intelligence activities and
counterterrorism policies are appropriate (e.g., the recent
congressional acquiescence to the JIR recommendations for a
statutory change to create a new Director of National Intelligence,
and the recommendation for a centralized all-source terrorism
information fusion center (IFC)),269 innovative congressional
initiatives that complement this fundamental restructuring are
needed to make sure that the executive branch is vigorously
following through on new counterterrorism reforms. The
intelligence committees of the House and the Senate should
consider drawing upon the model of "destabilization rights" in
public law litigation, articulated by Columbia Law professors
Sabel and Simon, whereby plaintiffs earn judicial approval "to
disentrench or unsettle a public institution when, first, it is failing
to satisfy minimum standards of adequate performance and,
second, it is substantially immune from conventional political
counterterrorism and fostering expertise of specific members of Congress).
265. Editorial, supra note 263, at A26.
266. Id.
267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21.
269. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text; infra note 304.
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mechanisms of correction." 270
While counterterrorist institutional failures of key national
security agencies of the executive branch of the federal
government, like the FBI, CIA, and NSA, fitfully uncovered in the
Joint Inquiry Report, are different from institutional failures of
public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police
departments, and housing authorities, these differences are in
degree, not in kind.271 Institution building, maintenance, repair,
and improvement have been a recurrent theme of American law
and democracy since Hart and Sacks articulated their vision of
legal process philosophy in the 1950s. 2 72 They noted, in this
regard:
[T]o help in seeing that the principle of institutional
settlement operates not merely as a principle of necessity
but as a principle of justice this means attention to the
constant improvement of all of the procedures which
depend upon the principle in the effort to assure that they
yield decisions which are not merely preferable to the
chaos of no decision but are calculated as well... to
advance the larger purposes of society. 273
Indeed, Guido Calabresi has described the legal process school
as primarily interested in "comparative institutional analysis,"274
270. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1062 (2004).
271. Cf id. at 1021-53 (discussing the details of institutional breakdown
in public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police departments, and
housing authorities).
272. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-4 (10th
ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994) (theorizing
that human conflict, in the satisfaction of human wants is an inescapable
feature of human interdependence and in resolving this inherent and
systemic conflict "affirmative and knowledgeable cooperation" through law is
necessary. Moreover, Hart and Sacks recognized that as part of their
fundamental interdependence with others, "people form themselves into
groups for the protection and advancement of their common interests"; so,
too, individuals establish "[tihe [i]nstitutionalization of [pirocedures for the
[slettlement of [q]uestions of [giroup [cloncern").
273. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
274. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches
to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113
(2003).
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with new legal process theorists of the Columbia School, like Sabel
and Simon, embracing "a spirit of Deweyen experimentalism by
focusing on the development of new institutions" 275  and
institutional procedures.
Just as courts in various types of public law litigation
involving schools, prisons and the like have, with maturing
experience, developed a general sense of the "inadequacy of
command-and-control approaches" 2 6 of highly prescriptive and
detailed injunctive orders because they came to appreciate that
"they lacked both the information and depth and range of control
to properly formulate and enforce command-and-control
injunctions" 277  while "command-and-control interventions
exacerbated resistance on the part of [institutional] defendants,"278
so should the United States Congress and its intelligence
committees develop a general sense of the inadequacy of top-down,
command-and-control statutory and budgetary measures to alter
the behavior of executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism
agencies. With the threat of imposing a "penalty of default"279 of
fundamental restructuring of executive branch intelligence and
counterterrorism executive branch agencies or appropriations
riders, the intelligence committees of the House and the Senate
should seek to experiment with three specific decentralized and
indirect forms of congressional oversight borrowed from the Sabel-
Simon new legal process insights about recent trends in judicial
supervision of public interest litigation.
First, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek to
spur "stakeholder negotiation"280 superintended by a special
mediator, with appropriate security clearance appointed by the
relevant congressional committee. Conducted with the authority
of an ongoing legislative oversight hearing, a congressional
intelligence committee should mandate that all relevant
stakeholders from the executive branch intelligence community
275. Id. at 2125 n.50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1053.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1067. For a general theoretical discussion of the challenges
and tools available for the conscientious American legislator, see generally
Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process
Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895 (2005).
280. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1067.
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deliberate with each other (most frequently in secret closed
sessions) "face to face" and be required to "defend their positions
with reasons."281 Intelligence committee-imposed stakeholder
negotiations should require participants "to listen to each other in
good faith and to remain open to learning"28 2 and, "[t]o the extent
that a [stakeholder's] proposals rest on factual premises, the
[stakeholder] must make available relevant information within
her control"28 3 without the excessive security blocks on sensitive
information that has characterized past executive branch
responses to congressional inquiries. The goal of these
stakeholder negotiations under congressional oversight
imprimatur should be consensus, to be achieved through
"openness" 284 and "mutual respect"28 5 within the confines of the
(often secret) negotiations. The intelligence committees of
Congress should strive to groom one or more of its members to
develop the role as mediator between executive branch agencies
because of the power and prestige this legislator would enjoy.
However, a professional, non-legislative
intelligence/counterterrorism mediator, under the control of the
relevant congressional intelligence committees, might prove to be
useful as well.
Second, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek
to instigate a "rolling-rule regime"28 6 where the norms of
counterterrorism policy emerging from stakeholder negotiations
with executive branch officials are "provisional,"287 "incorporate a
process of reassessment and revision with continuing stakeholder
participation."288  Stakeholders would be urged by the
congressional oversight mediators to develop "performance
measures that are as specific as possible,"28 9 leaving to executive
branch intelligence and counterterrorism agency officials
"substantial discretion,"290 subject, however, to "precise targets."291
281. Id. at 1068.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1068.
286. Id. at 1069 (footnote omitted).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1069.
20051
74 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:1
In addition, "some processes, most often including documentation
and reporting, will be specified in detail."292  With continuous
feedback by the congressional mediators, the intelligence
committees of Congress should develop interim oversight reports
which include "general descriptions of the
[intelligence/counterterrorism stakeholders'] goals, prescriptions
for measuring their progress toward them, and commitments to
make information available."293 Moreover, these congressional
interim intelligence oversight reports might also include "a variety
of other norms that set out, perhaps in great detail, practices or
operations procedures" 294 of executive branch agencies.
Third, the intelligence committees of Congress should try to
attain "transparency"295 in the executive branch intelligence and
counterterrorism operations, which, at a minimum, insists that
"the policies and operating norms of the rolling-rule regimes must
be explicit"296 and publicly declared to Congress (subject to
reasonable national security blocks to public access).
Transparency should be "both an accountability norm and a
learning device," 297 which is "intended in part to facilitate
practices of disciplined comparison."298 Congress, when armed
with these comparative metrics-which might include private
sector assessments of performance of counterterrorism
measures 299-- could reward those executive branch agencies which
291. Id. at 1070.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1071.
294. Id. According to Professors Sabel and Simon:
[W]hatever the technical legal status of the plans, their function is
not so much to coerce obedience as to introduce internal deliberation
and external transparency. Forcing the [stakeholders] ... to agree
on a clear description of their practices puts pressure on them to
reflect on and explain what they are doing. Moreover, the practice
norms enable outsiders to determine what the practitioners are up
to. They complement the performance norms by describing the
inputs that generate the outputs indicated by those norms.
Id. (footnote omitted).
295. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1071.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1072.
298. Id.
299. As an excellent model for private sector input into sensitive national
security matters, see NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015:
A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS NIC 2000-
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achieve good performance with autonomy and recommendations
for requested funding.300 "As for poor performance, the trick" for
Congress would be "to balance remedial support, loss of control,
and outright punishment" of deficient executive branch actions. 301
But legislative oversight "[e]xperimentalism does not provide
determinate guidance on the question of sanctions. It pins hopes
largely on the effects of transparency"30 2 with a context of national
security secretism. "By exposing poor performance as clearly as
possible, it opens the system to general scrutiny and exposes it
more readily"303 to congressional intervention.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Joint Inquiry conducted by the intelligence committees of
Congress to ascertain the causes of executive branch failures to
anticipate and possibly prevent the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 was deeply flawed. Hobbled by secretism and obstruction
by the executive branch, including the lack of cooperation by the
President and Vice President, divided by partisan bickering
within Congress, distracted by misguided public hearings and
accompanying political grandstanding, and weakened by poor
leadership of the Senate and House intelligence committees, the
Joint Inquiry and its work product, the Joint Inquiry Report,
suffered a lack of credibility. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the
Joint Inquiry on 9/11 can be understood as part of a steady erosion
in recent decades of the art of congressional oversight of the
executive branch of the federal government.
Congress could help to rectify its lackluster performance of
executive branch oversight, in general, and improve its oversight
of executive agency counterterrorism performance, in particular,
by considering three pragmatic internal congressional reforms 30 4:
02 (Dec. 2000) (discussing, among other "drivers and trends," the
development of "transnationai terrorism" and possible American responses).
300. Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1072.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1073.
303. Id.
304. The danger of these proposed reforms is that they will end up being
more process than real congressional oversight of executive branch
counterterrorism policy. Cf Orde F. Kittrie, More Process Than Peace:
Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1663
(2003) (book review) (the reliance of the drafters of the Oslo Accords relied to
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(1) consolidating intelligence review functions into the intelligence
committees; (2) fostering intelligence expertise of Senate and
House intelligence committee members; and (3) experimenting
with more decentralized and indirect forms of intervention by
creating intelligence mediators who would be responsible to
Congress and who would seek to spur (a) stakeholder negotiation,
(b) a rolling rule regime of norms for counterterrorism
performance and practice, and (c) transparency in executive
branch intelligence and counterterrorism operations, subject to
reasonable secrecy required by legitimate national security
considerations.
an excessive degree "on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity in their efforts
to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final settlement" which
"reliance proved to be disastrously counterproductive"). For the rather tepid
suggestions by the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional oversight of
intelligence and homeland security, see THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 8, at 419-21.
For interesting recent articles discussing the constitutional
dimensions of the post-9/11 terrorism environment-beyond the scope of this
Article-see generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Bruce
Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
For an account of congressional bills to incorporate the 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT's recommendations into legislation, see Philip Shenon,
Bipartisan Bill Offered on 9/11 Panel's Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004,
at Al. See also Editorial, Duty Chafes on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2004, at A26 ("The bipartisan Report's parallel warning that Congress must
reform itself to apply true intelligence oversight is flat-lining so far on Capitol
Hill as rival committee leaders defend a checkerboard full of important
fiefs.").
Congress, in late 2004, with prodding by President Bush, ended up
passing legislation that encapsulated many of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations-some of which had also been suggested by the
congressional Joint Inquiry. Perhaps the most significant change in the
intelligence law reforms was the creation of the position of National
Intelligence Director. See Intelligence, 63 CONG. QUART. WKLY. 24 (Jan. 3,
2005)
The first homeland security question to be resolved is whether the
House will create a more powerful committee to oversee
[intelligence] or continue to fragment oversight among dozens of
panels.... Congress passed the intelligence overhaul bill, but now
the Intelligence and Homeland Security committees will have to deal
with what they wrought, overseeing yet another major government
reorganization.
